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ABSTRACT

Essays in New Keynesian Monetary Policy
by
Tzu-Hao Huang

Advisor: Thom Thurston

The dissertation consists of three Chapters. I consider New Keynesian models which
involve tradeoffs between output gap and inflation variances. Such policy strategy is often
referred to as flexible inflation targeting rules (e.g., Lars Svensson 2011, pp.1238-95). Taylor
rules, in general, have the symbolic expression 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 , where 𝑖𝑡 is the

nominal interest rate at period t, 𝑥𝑡 is the target variable output gap at period t, 𝜋𝑡 is the target

variable inflation rate at period t, 𝑔𝑡 is realized shock to output gap at period t, and 𝜑𝑥 , 𝜑𝜋 and

𝜑𝑔 are coefficients. This three-term Taylor rule is the most efficient Taylor rule in terms of the

social welfare loss measurement (i.e., the minimized social welfare loss involved with the threeterm Taylor rule is the smallest value when we compare it with the minimized social welfare loss
involved with a one-term Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ) or a two-term Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 +

𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ).) Thus, the three-term Taylor rule is used as the benchmark for comparing the

performance of Taylor rules in the dissertation.

Chapter 1 argues that the dynamic interpretation most authors have put on the “stability
and uniqueness” (determinacy) condition of the new Keynesian monetary policy model is
inappropriate. Literatures authors maintain a belief when monetary policy is operating through a
iv

Taylor rule, the model stability and uniqueness requires the real interest rate move in the same
direction as inflation (Taylor Principle). This chapter shows the determinacy condition does not
necessarily require the Taylor Principle to hold. The Taylor Principle and the determinacy
condition are two different kettles of fish.
Although the three-term Taylor rule is applied in Chapter 1, some people may object or
think that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to expect the central bank (“the Fed”) bases a rule on a
shock term �𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 �. Thus, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I examine two-term (“simple”) Taylor

rules which do not have 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 term—i.e., 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 .

Chapter 2 is a study of the linear relationship of the coefficients 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in Taylor rules,

which 𝜑𝑥 is the coefficient to the target variable output gap (𝑥𝑡 ) and 𝜑𝜋 is the coefficient to the

target variable inflation rate (𝜋𝑡 ). Furthermore, since I use only 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in Taylor rules instead
of using 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 (i.e., the difference between price levels in two periods) in Taylor

rules, the Taylor rules do not cause optimal inertia. In other words, the Fed has once-and-for-all
response to the new development in either 𝑥𝑡 or 𝜋𝑡 , or both. Such new developments are either

from realized output gap shocks or inflation rate shocks or both. The monetary policy objective
function is then treated as a period quadratic social welfare loss function for two target variables
and their coefficients because the solution expectation for all periods is the same as the solution
for period t. The optimal policy implies that, especially, the coefficients 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 must

produce minimum social welfare loss to the economy when the Fed’s monetary policy target is
based on the tradeoffs between two target variables inflation rate 𝜋𝑡 (not price levels) and output
gap 𝑥𝑡 . For those policy-rate paths (expressed by Taylor rules) which the minimum social

welfare losses are guaranteed, I use the term optimal Taylor rules, and for those coefficient
v

values satisfied this purpose, I called them optimal coefficients or optimal linear relationship
among those coefficients. The natural optimum Taylor rule, as pointed out by Woodford (2001),
would have the 𝜑𝑔 term (= 𝜎), but for the reason in the previous paragraph, I only examine the
case of a simpler Taylor rule, 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥t + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 (hereafter this Taylor rule is called the simple

Taylor rule or the simple TR), when the rule is specified as the optimal interest rate rule for

governing the optimal paths of output gap and inflation rate. The global-type solutions with
“optimal inertia” will not be considered in all chapters.
The first part of Chapter 2 develops an approach to obtain the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and
1

𝜑𝜋 which is the first order condition for minimum social welfare loss, 𝐿 = 2 𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝛤𝑡2 ], where

L denotes social welfare loss, E is the expectational operator and 𝛤 is the weights on output gap.
The second part of Chapter 2 is the discussion of two properties of the linear relationship

of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 that are observed by comparing with the three-term Taylor: (a) the linear

relationship is the same for governing the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 whether g-shocks are

nullified by containing 𝜑g = 𝜎 in the baseline new Keynesian model or not; (b) the limit of the
social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ) is at the minimum

when the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are very big (or approaching infinity), and such minimum is the

same as the social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule. This implies the three-term
Taylor rule with 𝜑𝑔 (= 𝜎) suggested by Woodford (2001), whose model has different setup but it
works out with the same result, is more efficient than the simple (two-term) Taylor rule.

In Chapter 3, using the method developed from and the two properties discovered in
Chapter 2, I propose a combination monetary policy rule when the Fed sets the interest rate
before observing current variables of output gap (𝑥𝑡 ) and inflation (𝜋𝑡 ). The missing information
vi

is 𝜀𝑡 in 𝑥𝑡 equation—i.e., 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝜀𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜀2 ), and 𝜂𝑡 in 𝜋𝑡 equation—i.e.,

𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 where 𝜂𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 �0, 𝜎𝜂2 �. Thus, the Fed cannot adjust their interest rate for

those shocks because the Fed cannot observe 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . On the other hand, the information of

money is immediately available to the Fed when I use a model as abstract representation of the
Fed’s observation of money surprise, so the Fed can use signals about money to adjust their
interest rate. My model of the Fed’s operation on how they observe money surprise is a
simplified model for making a theoretical point, not for the purpose of improving what the Fed is
actually doing. The combination policy of a Taylor rule and money signal can improve the
social welfare loss when the Fed sets their monetary policy with unobservable shocks. Chapter 3
uses an inverted version of Poole’s (1970) combination policy analysis and shows that the social
welfare loss is improved from the money signals.

vii
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THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE AND TAYLOR RULE: TWO
DIFFERENT KETTLES OF FISH
with Thom Thurston

1

Abstract
In recent literature in monetary theory it is nearly universal to specify monetary
policy as operating through a Taylor rule and to interpret the well-known “stability and
uniqueness” (determinacy) condition as meaning that the Taylor rule makes the real
interest rate move in the same direction as inflation (Taylor Principle).

We first argue that the dynamic interpretation most authors have put on the NKM
determinacy condition is inappropriate. Second, we show the standard NKM
determinacy condition does not necessarily require the Taylor Principle to hold. The
Taylor Principle and the NKM determinacy condition are two different kettles of fish.

2

1.1 Introduction
In recent years a great deal of attention among monetary economists has been focused on the
issue of uniqueness, stability and/or “determinacy” in macroeconomic models, particular in the
New Keynesian Model (NKM). Modeling in NKM usually represents monetary policy as
following a Taylor rule, and the parameters of the Taylor rule must meet certain “determinacy
conditions” which may be necessary to rule out both “sunspots” and explosive solutions. At
least since the widely-cited article by Woodford (2001) there has been a consensus that the
determinacy condition in these models is essentially a restatement of the Taylor Principle – the
policy rule must guarantee that real interest rates will move in the same direction as inflation.
We beg to differ with this line of reasoning, at least within the context of the NKM.

Our argument is as follows. “Backward-looking” models (such as that by Taylor (1999)
himself) indeed require the Taylor Principle to hold for “stability” – meaning here where
projected paths eventually approach long-run or steady-state solutions of the endogenous
variables. But one should avoid conflating the Taylor Principle with the determinacy condition
in the forward-looking NKM. The determinacy condition in NKM, when met, assures us that the
model’s solution is unique. The dynamics are “stable” in the above sense by construction (all

3

shocks are AR(1)). If the determinacy condition is not met, the solution is “immediately
explosive” (no finite solution exists) or may result in non-explosive sunspot solutions.1

To illustrate our point, we begin by showing how the two concepts apply in simple,
univariate backward- and forward-looking models. Since many readers will be familiar with the
points in the univariate models, we relegate this to Appendix 1.8.1. Next and directly in the text,
we turn to two representative bivariate (inflation and output gap) backward- and forward-looking
models. The backward-looking model is Taylor’s (1999) model; the forward-looking model is
the baseline NKM as exposited by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2001, 2003) and
others. As a kind of coup de grace to the proposition that determinacy means Taylor Principle,
we produce two examples of solutions where the determinacy condition is met in the baseline
NKM with Taylor rule, but in which real interest rates move in the opposite direction of inflation.

1.2 The Backward-Looking Taylor (1999)
We start with the bivariate backward-looking model by Taylor (1999):

(1)
(2)
(3)

𝑥𝑡 = −𝛽(𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 − 𝑟) + 𝑔𝑡
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡

1

This paper does not analyze “sunspot” solutions. For sunspot we refer readers to Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2002), Evans and McGough (2005) and Chadha and Corrado (2006). These are rational
solutions that reflect certain arbitrary and “non-fundamental” disturbances to expectations which produce selffulfilling and non-explosive solutions when the mathematical determinacy conditions are not met. When the
determinacy conditions are met, the effect is to rule out (in some cases “cancel out”) the effects of the sunspots. Our
focus will be on whether meeting the determinacy conditions has dynamic implications apart from ruling out
sunspots and/or being instantly explosive. We will argue that determinacy conditions do not have such implications
for the baseline New Keynesian Model, notwithstanding widespread claims they do.

4

where x represent the output gap in logs; π represents the inflation rate; 𝑖 represents the short

term nominal interest rate. 𝑔 and 𝑢 represent (independent and not auto-correlated) shocks with

zero mean. The model parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are positive. r represents the natural rate of interest.

𝜑0 , 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 are the policy parameters of the Taylor rule.
The solution path of inflation can be written as:

(4)

𝑛

𝛼

𝑛

𝜋𝑡+𝑖 = Λ𝑖−1 𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼Λ𝑖−1 𝑥𝑡 + �𝑖=1 Λ𝑖−1 𝑔𝑡+𝑖 + 1+𝛽𝜑 �𝑖=1 Λ𝑖−1 𝑢𝑡+𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛

where the subscript t denotes time and Λ =

𝑥

α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋 )+(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 )
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥

. The key parameter is Λ, which if

inside the unit circle will mean that projections of 𝜋𝑡+𝑖 will eventually approach the model’s
𝜑 −𝑟

0
steady-state value (1−𝜑
) – hence, the model is “stable” in the sense Taylor intended. If Λ lies
𝜋

outside the unit circle the model’s projections will depart continuously from steady-state values;

if Λ lies on the unit circle the model’s projection will approach a value that differs from the
steady-state value. In these cases the model is “unstable” in the Taylor sense, though not
“explosive” in the immediate sense. Each period’s projection is well-defined.

5

Since Λ = 1 +

2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 ) 2
.
𝛼𝛼

α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋 )
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥

, the Taylor stability condition can be simplified to 1 < 𝜑𝜋 < 1 +

This establishes the Taylor Principle and its role in this model. Taylor (1999) and

Cochrane (2011) in his description of the Taylor (1999) model neglect the upper bound required
on 𝜑𝜋 , emphasizing only the requirement that 𝜑𝜋 > 1 for Taylor stability. 3

1.3 The Forward-Looking NKM Model: Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)
Now while the Taylor Principle governs whether a backward-looking model like Taylor’s above
will be “stable” in terms of tending toward steady-state, there is no similar implication for
forward-looking models. To illustrate this point, we turn to the bivariate forward-looking model
of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, henceforth CGG(1999)). Their baseline NKM consists of the
familiar equations for the output gap (“IS”) and inflation (“Phillips curve”):
1

𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] − 𝜎 (𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ]) + 𝑔𝑡

(5)

𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] + 𝑢𝑡

(6)

2

−1 < Λ < 1, so −1 < 1 +

If 1 + 𝛽𝜑𝑥 > 1:
If α𝛽 > 0:

−2 <

α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋 )

1+𝛽𝜑𝑥
α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋 )
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥

<1

< 0.

−2(1 + 𝛽𝜑𝑥 ) < α𝛽(1 − 𝜑𝜋 ) < 0.
−2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 )
< 1 − 𝜑𝜋 < 0
α𝛽

0 < 𝜑𝜋 − 1 <

1 < 𝜑𝜋 < 1 +

2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 )

α𝛽
2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 )
α𝛽

.

Since α, 𝛽 and 𝜑𝑥 are assumed to be positive from Taylor (1999), we obtain 1 < 𝜑𝜋 < 1 +

2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 )
α𝛽

.

This does not seem to be a particularly important omission, since the Fed is presumably free to increase 𝜑𝑥 as
2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥 )
> 𝜑𝜋 so as to prevent Taylor “instability.”
needed to maintain 1 +

3

𝛼𝛼

6

where x again represents output gap in logs; 𝜋 represents inflation (log-deviation from steadystate); and i represents the nominal interest rate (deviation from steady-state); 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is a

discount factor; 𝑘 > 0 is the Phillips curve parameter reflecting the degree of price flexibility

(higher means more), and 𝜎 > 0 is the consumption-elasticity of utility. 𝑔𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 are shocks of
AR(1) form: 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (0 < 𝜆 < 1) and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 (0 < 𝜌 < 1).

This model needs to be closed by one of two means. CGG (1999, p.1668) employed, in
their wording, a welfare measure in the form of a quadratic loss function
1

∞

2
2
𝑊 = − 2 �𝑖=0 𝛽 𝑖 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+𝑖
+ 𝛤𝑥𝑡+𝑖
]

(7)

where Γ is a relative weight on preferences for the output gap (x) relative to inflation (𝜋). This

provides a first order condition constraint which, together with (5) and (6), permits the derivation
of optimal paths for the endogenous variables. The optimal paths themselves do not address the
determinacy issue, but it is possible to derive a monetary policy rule (which usually but not
necessarily means a Taylor rule) that is consistent with the optimal paths. Once the rule is
imposed it is possible to set conditions for determinacy for this rule. More details are provided
in Appendix 1.8.1.

More generally, a monetary policy rule (again usually a Taylor rule) can simply be added
to (5) and (6) so that the endogenous variables depend on the parameters of the rule. These
parameters will indicate whether the solutions are determinate.

7

1.4 Determinacy with the Taylor Rule
Let the particular Taylor rule be written as

(8)

𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡

which includes no intercept (the model is derived as log-linearized deviations from steady-state)
and contains a 𝜑𝑔 which can be used to offset 𝑔𝑡 shocks. 4 Putting (8) into (5) and (6), the model

can be written in the matrix form 𝐌𝐭 = 𝐀𝐌𝐭+𝟏 + 𝐞𝐭 , where 𝐌𝐭′ = [𝑥𝑡

′
𝜋𝑡 ], 𝐌𝐭+𝟏
=

[𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ]] , A is the two-by-two coefficient matrix and e is a vector of exogenous

shock terms. The solution of the model will be linear in 𝑢𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡 . Bullard and Mitra

(2002(2000)) showed that determinacy of this model requires that the eigenvalues of A lie within
the unit circle, which in turn requires

(9)

𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0.
It turns out that in the general solutions, for any set of 𝜑’s the first order conditions’ still

make 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 proportional; therefore, the optimal ratio of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 can be replaced by any
arbitrary values R depends on which combination of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 we pick. 5

The optimal Taylor rule, as pointed out by Woodford (2001) would have 𝜑𝑔 term (= 𝜎), but some people may
object or think that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to expect the Fed bases a rule on a shock term. In chapter 2 and
chapter 3, I examine the “simple Taylor Rule” which does not have that term.
4

In other words, any set of 𝜑’s suggests a particular 𝛤 and other coefficients. The optimal set of 𝜑’s of course will
be obtained only if we use the “true” 𝛤. The general solution of course does not in itself reveal the true 𝛤.
5

8

1.5 Two Examples Having Unique Solutions But Still Violate the Taylor
Principle
The Taylor Principle is not necessary for a forward-looking model to have uniqueness. The
following examples show that using Taylor Principle as the economic reasoning for the
uniqueness of the forward-looking model is inappropriate.

An Example for u-shock Only
For this case, we either assume 𝑔𝑡 = 0 for all t, or posit that the authorities set the Taylor

rule parameter 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎, which essentially nullifies these demand shocks. Having only one shock

means the solution for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 will be proportional to 𝑢𝑡 , which means that the expected 𝑡 + 1

values of these variables can be written as 𝜌 times their current values. Then taking the total
differentials of (5) with 𝑖𝑡 represented by the Taylor rule and (6), one arrives at a constraint

between movements in the real interest rate 𝑟𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] as
(10)

𝑟𝑡 = �

𝜎(1−𝜌)

𝜎(1−𝜌)+𝜑𝑥

(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)� 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ].

Details can be found in Appendix 1.8.2. The term in the brackets of (10) must be negative if
𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌 for any positive 𝜑𝑥 , and 𝜑𝑥 > 0 is then also required by the determinacy condition
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(9). 6 For any policy setting that is not explosive or accommodative of sunspots, the real
interest rate must decline in expected inflation when 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌, rise in expected inflation when
𝜑𝜋 > 𝜌 or indeed not change in expected inflation (interest rate change matches inflation)

when 𝜑𝜋 = 𝜌. Figure 1.1 presents an illustrative simulation of the period t effects of 𝑢𝑡 on

the real interest rate for various settings of 𝜑𝜋 . In addition, Figure 1.2 shows the impulse

responses to the unit of 𝑢𝑡 in DYNARE/MATLAB with the parameter values of 𝜌 = 0.5,

𝜑𝜋 = 0.3, 𝜑𝑥 = 22, 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 = 1, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99. The effect of 𝑢𝑡 is to change 𝑟𝑡 in the
opposite direction after which it returns gradually to the steady-state.

From equation (9): 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌 + 𝜌 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0
𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌) + 𝑘(𝜌 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0
(1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 𝑘(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ) + 𝑘(1 − 𝜌).
𝑘(𝜌−𝜑𝜋 )+𝑘(1−𝜌)
If (1 − 𝛽) > 0,
𝜑𝑥 >
.
6

(1−𝛽)

If 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌, 𝜑𝑥 is always positive. Since 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 𝑘 > 0 and 0 < 𝜌 < 1, 𝜑𝑥 > 0.
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Figure 1.1: Simulated Deviations in the Real Interest Rate Created by a Unit Shock in 𝒖𝒕

Note: Assumed parameters: 𝜌 = 0.5, Γ = 2, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝜎 = 1, 𝛽 = 0.99. The 𝜑𝑥 term is set in each
case so that the right side of the determinacy condition (9) is equal to 0.05.
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Figure 1.2 Impulse Responses to 𝒖𝒕 : Real Interest Rates Decline with Inflation

Assumed parameters: 𝜌 = 0.5, 𝜑𝜋 = 0.3, 𝜑𝑥 = 22, 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 = 1, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99

It should be noted that setting 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌 (with 𝜑𝑥 high enough to assure determinacy) will

never provide an optimal outcome in this baseline NKM. 7 Figure 1.3 illustrates the effect of

7

As a qualification, we mention here that Thurston (2012) demonstrates that if the welfare function maximized by
the authorities contains a term reflecting the variance of the interest rate, and if the weight on this variance
approaches infinity, the optimal Taylor rule will result in this limit to a constant. Inflation and projected inflation
respond positively to 𝑢-(and 𝑔-)shocks –thus, another example of the real interest rate declining in inflation. More
to the point, this is a case where the optimal policy requires that the real interest rate decline in inflation.
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constraining 𝜑𝜋 to equal or below 𝜌. Determinate Taylor rule settings are restricted to a range
that cannot include the optimal setting.

Figure 1.3. When 𝝋𝝅 is constrained to be less or equal to 𝝆

𝜑𝜋

Optimal Combination

𝜌

0
𝑘𝑘(1−𝜌)

𝑘

𝜑𝑥

Note: The solid line denotes the optimal condition 𝜑𝜋 = 𝜌 +
+ 𝜑𝑥 . The dotted line indicates the boundaries
Γ
Γ
of the determinacy condition 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + 𝜑𝑥 (1 − 𝛽) > 0. The intercept of solid line at the vertical axis must be
greater than 𝜌.

It is worth noting also that the optimal setting of the Taylor rule must involve the Taylor
Principle (real interest rates rising in inflation), which conforms to the result of CGG (1999, p.
1672) for this model in which the optimal interest rate is (using our notation)
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𝑖𝑡 = �1 +

(11)

(1−𝜌)𝑘𝑘
𝜌Γ

� 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = �1 +

(1−𝜌)𝑘𝑘
𝜌Γ

� 𝜌𝜋𝑡 ,

where the term in brackets must be greater than unity. To say that the Taylor Principle should
apply is of course using “should” in the normative sense rather than a condition for determinacy.

An Example for g-shocks Only
What if the origin of the inflation in question comes from the demand side (through 𝑔)?

Does the determinacy condition (9) mean the real interest rate must move in the same direction
as inflation? The answer is no, the real interest rate and inflation rate can move in different,
opposite direction, although the conditions are less straightforward than in the previous example.
We derive two boundary conditions relating 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 , in addition to one shown earlier for

determinacy. The first additional boundary:

𝜑𝜋 = 𝜆 +

(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜑𝑥
,
𝑘

which implies that the real interest rate declines in expected inflation given a positive g-shock.
The second additional boundary:
𝜑𝜋 = 𝜆 +

(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜑𝑥 𝜎(1 − 𝜆)(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
+
,
𝑘
𝑘

which implies that the inflation rate and g-shocks are positively relative. Details also can be
found in Appendix 1.8.2.

These boundary conditions are illustrated in Figure 1.4. As before, determinacy requires
the combination of 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 lie to the Northeast of the dotted boundary. The first new
boundary is for the condition 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜆 +

(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘

which assures that real interest rates will
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decline as 𝑔 and inflation rise. (Recall that 𝜆 is the autoregressive parameter in the 𝑔 process,
𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 , 0 < λ < 1.) The second new boundary is 𝜑𝜋 > 𝜆 +

(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘

+

𝜎(1−𝜆)(𝛽𝛽−1)
𝑘

,

which is required in order for inflation to rise with the 𝑔-shocks. The shadowed area to the left
in the Figure 1.4 represents combinations that provide determinacy, positive impacts of 𝑔𝑡 on

inflation, and declines in the real interest rates as 𝑔𝑡 and inflation both rise. Figure 1.5 illustrates
the impulse responses from DYNARE/MATLAB calculations for a downward movement in real
interest rates, in response to a positive shock of 𝑔𝑡 , followed by a gradual increase in the real

interest rate back to equilibrium.
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Figure 1.4. Regions Where the Real Interest Rates Decline when Inflation Increases Upon
Arrival of a 𝒈 shock

Note: Shadowed area is where demand shocks increase expected inflation which leads to negatively real
interest rate effect. Assumed parameters: 𝝀 = 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝝋𝝅 = 𝟏. 𝟎𝟎, 𝝋𝒙 = −𝟎. 𝟑𝟑, 𝝋𝒈 = 𝟏, 𝒌 = 𝟎. 𝟑, 𝜷 =
𝟎. 𝟗𝟗 and 𝝈 = 𝟏.
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Figure 1.5. Impulse Response to 𝒈𝒕 : Real Interest Rates Declines with Inflation

Assumed parameters: 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝜑𝜋 = 1.02, 𝜑𝑥 = −0.31, 𝜑𝑔 = 1, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99, 𝜎 = 1

1.6 Conflating the Taylor Rule with the Taylor Principle
The interpretation of the NKM-Taylor rule determinacy condition by Woodford (2001, p. 233) is
probably the most elegantly expressed and most widely cited:

The determinacy condition…has a simple interpretation. A feedback rule satisfies
the Taylor Principle if it implies that in the event of a sustained increase in the
17

inflation rate by k percent, the nominal interest rate will eventually be raised by more
than k percent. In the context of the model sketched above, each percentage point of
permanent increase in the inflation rate implies an increase in the long-run average
output gap of

1−𝛽
𝑘

percent; thus a rule of the form conforms to the Taylor Principle if

an only if the coefficients 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 satisfy 𝜑𝜋 +

1−𝛽
𝑘

𝜑𝑥 > 1. In particular, the

coefficient values necessarily satisfy the criterion, regardless of the size of 𝛽 and 𝑘.

Thus the kind of feedback prescribed in the Taylor rule [𝜑𝑥 = 0.5, 𝜑𝜋 = 1.5] suffices

to determine an equilibrium price level.

What is our objection to the statement above? First, the paragraph implies that the determinacy
condition influences the dynamic paths of 𝜋𝑡 (and presumably 𝑥𝑡 ), whereas we noted earlier that
(9) ensures unique paths for 𝜋 and 𝑥 which are reached instantly according to NKM. Second,
Woodford’s statement suggests that in order for these unique paths to be obtained the Taylor

Principle must be applied - i.e., real interest rates must rise with inflation. It has become nearly
universal to assert that positive co-variation between the real interest rate and inflation is critical
in avoiding explosive solutions and sunspots. Table 1.8.3 in Appendix lists recent articles and is
grouped according to the level of explicitness with which they conflate the Taylor Principle (real
interest rates rising in inflation) with the standard determinacy condition (9).

The important result we found was that the standard eigenvalue condition (9) for this
model is sufficient but not necessary in the case of the standard baseline NKM with Taylor rule. 8

8

Rising real interest in inflation may be necessary for optimality, but not for uniqueness and stability.
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In particular, when the model has only one shock (9) is less “stringent.” For examples, the
conditions for only 𝑢 shock case:
and for only 𝑔 shock case:

(1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌) > 0
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜆) > 0.

The latter applies over a certain range that cannot have a “too negative” value of 𝜑𝑥 . In

Woodford (2001), only the 𝑔 shock is considered. In CGG (1999), only the 𝑢 shock is part of

the optimal paths. Thurston (2010, 2012) further demonstrates another essential point in CGG
(1999) which the Taylor rule which gives optimal paths subject to being able to have the interest
rate jump to offset 𝑔 shocks. The result is that 𝑔 shocks are effectively removed from the

solution. In this case, the solution is a function of only one shock, and the model can be written
as two univariate forward equations each having the same “b.” 9 The condition b in the unit
circle implies the conditions above, which are “inside” the standard one. These are examples for
demonstrating the determinacy condition intuitively.

9

Thurston (2010, 2012) derived an optimal Taylor rule for the model (5), (6), and (8) as
𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎,
and
𝑘
𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝜌)
𝜑𝜋 = 𝜑𝑥 +
+ 𝜌,
𝛤
𝛤
which obviously provides multiple possible values for 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 . As illustrated in Figure 1.6 in Appendix 1.8.1.,
the unique, optimal paths
𝑘
𝑢,
𝑥𝑡 = − 2
𝑘 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
and
𝛤
𝜋𝑡 = 2
𝑢
𝑘 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
will necessarily be reached for all combinations of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 that lie to the Northeast of the borderline for
determinacy (9).
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1.7 Conclusion
The literature has erroneously conflated the Taylor Principle with the NKM determinacy
condition. They are two different kettles of fish.

1.8 Appendixes
1.8.1 The Interpretation of Determinacy Condition in CGG(1999)
To demonstrate the optimized model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) has a less “stringent”
determinacy condition than the standard determinacy one: first, solve the model for 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 as
function of their two expected values, 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] and 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ]; second, convert these into a two𝑘

equation, univariate model using the first order condition, 𝑥𝑡 = − Γ 𝜋𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] =
𝑘

− Γ 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ]; third, constrain the 𝜑s to follow the optimal locus (𝜑π = 𝜌 +

𝑘𝜎(1−𝜌)
Γ

𝑘

+ Γ 𝜑𝑥 ).

Taking the univariate equations above for 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 as functions of 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] and 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ],

respectively, find a value for 𝜑𝑥 that makes the coefficient on the expected future values just

equal to unity in each equation (the expression will be the same in both equations). The value
of 𝜑𝑥′ for 𝜋𝑡 shown in Figure 1.6 is:

(12)

𝜑𝑥′ =

(𝜌−1)𝑘Γ+(2−𝜌)𝑘 2 𝜎+(1−𝛽)𝜎Γ
−𝑘 2 −Γ+βΓ

.

This establishes the “borderline” 𝜑𝑥′ and the associated 𝜑𝜋′ which will meet the optimality

condition and above which make the coefficients on the respective expected values less than
unity.
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Second, find the intersection of the optimality condition 𝜑π = 𝜌 +

𝑘𝑘(1−𝜌)
Γ

𝑘

+ Γ 𝜑𝑥 and the

lower boundary of the determinacy condition expressed as 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 = 0.
The intersection solution for 𝜑𝑥 is 𝜑𝑥′′ is:
(13)

𝜑𝑥′′ =

(𝜌−1)(𝑘Γ−𝑘 2 𝜎)
−𝑘 2 −Γ+βΓ

.

Values of 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 must exceed 𝜑𝑥′′ and its associated 𝜑𝜋′′ in Figure 1.6 in order to meet the

standard determinacy condition.

Third, subtract (13) from (12):

(14)

𝜑𝑥′′ − 𝜑𝑥′ =

−𝑘 2 𝜎−(1−𝛽)𝜎Γ
−𝑘 2 −(1−β)Γ

.

The value of (14) is positive given the fact that both numerator and denominator are negative.
The borderline combinations for 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 in the standard case are larger, respectively, than

those for the optimized model case.
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Figure 1.6. The Optimality Condition and the Determinacy Condition

Note: [𝜑𝑥′ , 𝜑𝜋′ ] is the intercept of borderline and the optimal locus which meets
optimality/time-consistency and make the coefficient on the future value equal to one.
[𝜑𝑥′′ , 𝜑𝜋′′ ] is the intercept whose values are optimal and meet the standard determinacy
lower-bound, 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽) = 0.

We can observe that two lines, the borderline and the standard determinacy lower-bound,
have the same slope. This can be shown analytically by letting the coefficient on the expected
future value less than unity in either one of two univariate equations from CGG(1999) model.
Rearranging the inequality, we obtain:
𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝜋 >

𝛤(𝛽 − 1) − 𝑘2
𝜎.
𝛤

Since 𝛽 has the value between zero and one, the right hand side of the inequality always has
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negative value. 10 The determinacy condition of the optimized CGG(1999) implies that the
coefficient on the expected future value is less than one. Thus, the determinacy condition for the
optimized model of CGG(1999) is less stringent than the standard determinacy condition.

1.8.2 The Comovement of Real Interest Rate and Inflation
To derive the condition for which the real interest rate will move in the opposite direction of
inflation while the model still satisfies the NKM determinacy condition, first, consider the case
where inflation is driven exclusively by 𝑢𝑡 as in (10). Noting that 𝜋𝑡 =
𝜑

𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ]
𝜌

write the real

interest rate 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = � 𝜋 − 1� 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] + 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 .
𝜌

Substitute this last expression into (5) and, noting that 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] = 𝜌𝑥𝑡 , derive (10). The NKM

determinacy condition will be met with 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌 provided that 𝜑𝑥 is large enough.

To obtain conditions where inflation is exclusively driven by 𝑔𝑡 , note that 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] =

𝜆𝑥𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = 𝜆𝜋𝑡 and that the real interest rate is proportional to expected inflation:
(15)

𝑟𝑡 = {𝜑𝜋 − (

(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘

+ 𝜆)}𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ].

We obtain (15) by substituting out 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] and 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] in (5) and (6) by 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] =

𝜆𝑥𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = 𝜆𝜋𝑡 , and then we substitutes them into Taylor rule 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 (note

that we let 𝜑𝑔 = 0, so 𝑔𝑡 -shocks are not nullified by 𝜑𝑔 ), the real interest rate is that the nominal
It is also true when the value of 𝛤 either approaches infinity or equals zero. Using 𝐿’𝐻𝑜�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝’s rule, we can find
the limit of right hand side of inequality is an negative value: 𝜎(𝛽 − 1), when 𝛤 approaches infinity or equals zero.
10
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interest rate subtracts the expected inflation. One boundary condition used in Figure 1.4 is that
the real interest rate declines in expected inflation; this requires 𝜑𝜋 < (

(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘

+ 𝜆. Next,

substitute (15) and (5) into (6) to derive an expression for inflation (and 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ]) that is a
function of 𝑔𝑡 , 𝜋t = �𝜑𝜋 − [�𝜆 +

𝜎(1−𝜆)(𝛽𝛽−1)
𝑘

�+

(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘

]� 𝑔𝑡 . For the coefficient on 𝑔𝑡 to be

positive, this requires the another boundary condition that 𝜑𝜋 > [�𝜆 +

𝜎(1−𝜆)(𝛽𝛽−1)
𝑘

�+

(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘

which also is illustrated in Figure 7. Finally, the NKM determinacy condition (9) boundary as
illustrated in Figure 7 can be written 𝜑𝜋 > 1 −

(1−𝛽)
𝜅

]

𝜑𝑥 .
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Woodford (2001, p.233), Walsh (2010,
p.342), Gali (2008, pp.78-79),

Kurozumi & Zandweghe (2008,
p.1492), Kurozumi & Zandweghe
(2011, p.1026), Duffy & Xiao (2011,
p.990), Bullard & Singh (2008, p.
S39), Bullard & Schaling (2009,
p.1591, p.1609)

3. Model is simply constructed so
that the model will exhibit the
Taylor Principle and determinacy
provides for a certain condition
to hold (for example, 𝜑𝜋 > 1).

Misleading also, in that it hints that
somehow the fact that the Taylor Principle
holds is responsible for determinacy, when
in fact it is by coincidence that both Taylor
Principle and determinacy occur

Misleading, in that an implication is made
that in the “long run,” or “eventually,” the
real rate must rise in order to imply
determinacy

*Cochrane unlike others in this table, criticizes the NKM on the grounds that its mechanism toward arriving at determinate equilibrium is ill-conceived.
However, his characterization of the NKM position on this issue is basically the same as the others in Level 1 of this table.

Ascari & Ropele (2009, p. 1566),
Oistein Roisland (2003, pp. 149-150),
Llosa & Tuesta (2008, p.1034,
p.1042), Llosa & Tuesta (2009,
p.1883), Duffy & Xiao (2011, p.975),
Davig & Leeper (2007, p.607, p.612),
Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2009,
p.9, p.11)

Gali (2008, pp. 78-79): “the equilibrium will be
unique under interest rate rule whenever 𝜑𝑥
and 𝜑𝜋 are sufficiently large enough to guarantee
that the real rate eventually rises in the face of an
increase in inflation.”

Walsh (2010, p.342): “a policy that raised the nominal
interest rate when inflation rose, and raised 𝑖𝑡 enough
to increase the real interest rate so that the output gap
fell, would be sufficient to ensure a unique
equilibrium.”

*Cochrane (2011, pp. 572-573,
p.583)

Descriptions

Authors

2. The NKM’s determinacy
condition is simply defined as
the “long-run” or “generalized”
Taylor Principle. No direct
statement is provided that the
real interest rate must rise in
inflation in order to achieve
determinacy, but this is implied.

1. Clear-cut statements are made
that “real interest rate rises with
inflation” and that condition
leads to determinacy in NKM

Level

Three Levels of Conflation

1.8.3 Treatment of the Taylor Principle vs. NKM Determinacy Condition in
Recent Literature
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2

THE SOCIAL WELFARE LOSS AND THE SIMPLE TAYLOR RULE
IN THE BASELINE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL
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Abstract
Taylor rules, in general, have the symbolic expression 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 . This three-

term Taylor rule is the most efficient Taylor rule in terms of the social welfare loss measurement
(i.e., the minimized social welfare loss involved with the three-term Taylor rule is the smallest
value when we compare it with the minimized social welfare loss involved with a one-term
Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ) or a two-term Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ).) The three-term Taylor
rule is used in this paper as the benchmark for comparing the performance of these kinds of

Taylor rules. However, some people may object or think that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to
expect the central bank (“the Fed”) bases a rule on a shock term (𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 ), and because of this

reason, my focus is only on two-term (“simple”) Taylor rules which do not have 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 term—i.e.,

𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 —, in this chapter and next chapter. From now on and through the rest of the

dissertation, the two-term Taylor rules are called the simple Taylor rules for distinguishing them
from the three-term Taylor rules.
This chapter is a study of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 when the simple Taylor rules

are specified as the optimal interest rate rules, which I call the “optimal simple” Taylor rule, for

governing the optimal paths of output gap (𝑥𝑡 ) and inflation rate (𝜋𝑡 ). The first part of this study
27

𝑘

develops an approach to obtain the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 —i.e., 𝜑𝜋 = − 𝛤(𝛽𝛽−1) 𝜑𝑥 +
𝑘𝑘(𝜌−1)

𝛤(𝛽𝛽−1)
1
2

+ 𝜌—, which meets the first order condition for minimum social welfare loss, 𝐿 =

𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝛤𝑡2 ].

The second part is the discussion of two properties of the optimal linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥

and 𝜑𝜋 that are observed by comparing with the three-term Taylor rules: (a) the linear

relationship is the same for governing the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 whether g-shocks are

nullified by containing 𝜑g = 𝜎 in the baseline new Keynesian model or not; (b) the limit of the
social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ) is at the minimum

when the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are very big (or approaching infinity), and such minimum is the

same as the social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule. This implies the threeterm Taylor rule with 𝜑𝑔 (= 𝜎) suggested by Woodford (2001), whose model has different

setup but it works out with the same result, is more efficient than the simple (two-term) Taylor
rule.
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2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we show that a particular (three-term) Taylor rule,
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 ,

is specified as the optimal interest rate rule (or the optimal Taylor rule) for governing the optimal
paths of output gap (𝑥𝑡 ) and inflation rate (𝜋𝑡 ) when the coefficient values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 has a

linear relationship,

𝜑𝜋 =

𝑘
𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝜌)
𝜑𝑥 +
+ 𝜌,
𝛤
𝛤

which is the first order condition for minimum social welfare loss whose specification is similar
to what is introduced in section 1.3 equation (7),
∞

1
2
2
],
+ 𝛤𝑥𝑡+𝑖
𝐿𝑝 = � 𝛽 𝑖 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+𝑖
2
𝑖=0

where the subscript 𝑝 denotes the present value of the social welfare loss over time 11, and when
𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎

for nullifying g-shocks in the baseline new Keynesian model introduced in section 1.3 equation
(5):

and equation (6):

1
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] − (𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ]) + 𝑔𝑡
𝜎
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] + 𝑢𝑡 .

𝐿𝑝 is a positive value but the 𝑊 function (i.e., equation (7) in section 1.3) is a negative value. 𝐿𝑝 and 𝑊 both
have multiple terms over time. I will only need the first term of 𝐿𝑝 in chapter 2 and chapter 3 because the Fed’s
policy strategy is assumed to be the commitment to the Taylor rules and the solution expectation for all period is the
same as the solution for period t. The detail explanation for only using the first term of 𝐿𝑝 is in the section 2.2.
11
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The derivation of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 shown above is not a difficult task once we
nullify g-shocks. See the details of the derivation in Appendix 2.5.1. In addition, the linear
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 for the particular Taylor rule in the case of a central bank’s

commitment to the particular Taylor rule can be derived as
𝜑𝜋 = −

𝑘
𝑘𝑘(𝜌 − 1)
𝜑𝑥 +
+ 𝜌.
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)

Appendix 2.5.2 shows the Maple commands for obtaining (1).

(1)

However, the derivation of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case of a simple

Taylor rule,

𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ,

(2)

is not an easy task when the g-shocks are not nullified in the baseline new Keynesian model. 12

The first part of this chapter provides an alternative approach to avoid messy analytical result or
no result. The alternative approach involves three components: (a) Thurston’s (2010, 2012)
method for obtaining general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in the central-bank loss function which is
presented in Appendix 2.5.4; (b) the first and second partial derivative tests; and (c) the
mathematical concepts of limit.

The second part of this chapter is the discussion of two properties of the optimal linear
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule (2): (a) the linear relationship obtained from

the case of commitment to the simple Taylor rule (2) is the same as the relationship (1) from the
case of commitment to the three-term Taylor rule; (b) the limit of the social welfare loss

In Appendix 2.5.3, I demonstrate the result of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 for (2) is either a mess or void
when the same approach from Appendix 2.5.2 is applied.

12
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containing the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ) is at the minimum when the values of 𝜑𝑥
and 𝜑𝜋 are very big (or approaching infinity), and such minimum is the same as the social

welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule. This implies the three-term Taylor rule with
𝜑𝑔 (= 𝜎) suggested by Woodford (2001), whose model has different setup but it works out with

the same result, is more efficient than the simple Taylor rule. The first property implies that the
optimal linear relationship between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 is the same for governing the optimal paths of

output gap (𝑥𝑡 ) and inflation rate (𝜋𝑡 ) whether the Taylor rule nullifies g-shocks or not. The

second property implies that the three-term Taylor rule is more efficient because it allows us to
perfectly eliminate the g-shocks while the simple Taylor rule cannot.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 derives the linear
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule (2). The relationship is the constraint for

determining the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 when the social welfare loss is at minimum. Section 2.3
compares the social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule and the social welfare loss
containing the three-term Taylor rule. I observe that the minimized social welfare loss
containing the three-term Taylor rule is smaller than the minimized social welfare loss
containing the simple Taylor rule. Furthermore, when 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are approaching infinity, the

limiting value of the minimized social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule is the same
as the minimized social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule. Note that I am not
suggesting that the Fed can force 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 to approach infinity. It is only for the comparison

purpose not for the practical reason by letting 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 approach infinity when we want to
know the performance of different Taylor rules. When the performance of a Taylor rule is

improved, the minimized social welfare loss containing such Taylor rule will be reduced and
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move close to the minimized social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule. I will
discuss this application in details in Chapter 3. Section 2.4 contains the conclusion. Section 2.5
contains the appendices.

2.2 An Optimal Monetary Policy is Specified by a Simple Taylor Rule
The analytical derivation remains unsolved for the linear relationship which is the constraint for
determining the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 when the social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor

rule is at minimum. On the other hand, Woodford (2001, p.235) and Thurston (2010, 2012) both
solve the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case of three-term Taylor rule which g-shocks
are nullified 13 by 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎, whose results are the same as the equation (1) shown in the Section

2.1. This paper provides the method for determining the analytical values of the optimal 14

𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the NKM from the viewpoint of the central-bank policy actions following from its

commitment to the simple Taylor rule (2). The specification of equation (2) is the first step. The
second step, I specify the model economy in the new Keynesian theories which is the baseline
NKM well defined in Chapter 1 section 1.3 included the equation of output gap 𝑥𝑡 from a
forward-looking IS curve shown as
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝑥𝑡+1 −

1
(𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) + 𝑔𝑡
𝜎 𝑡

and the equation of inflation 𝜋𝑡 from a New Keynesian Philips curve shown as

(3a)

Walsh (2003, p.549) also had the description for using 𝜑𝑔 to nullify 𝑔𝑡 (my expression of output gap shocks).
Note that Walsh used 𝑢𝑡 for the expression of output gap shocks in his book.

13

14

At this point, these are only optimal conditional on the central bank following the simple Taylor rule which
guarantee the extremum of loss function. When the central bank commits to the rule, the fully optimal policy are
those been studied in Walsh (2003) section 11.3.
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𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡 ,

(3b)

where 𝑔𝑡 is the demand shocks and 𝑢𝑡 is the inflation shocks. 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 𝑘, 𝜎 > 0, 0 < 𝜌 < 1

and 0 < 𝜆 < 1. For the ease of exposition, the shocks in this paper follow the AR(1) processes 15,

so 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 are i.i.d. normally distributed with

variances 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝜂2 . The shocks are interrelated by construction in the baseline NKM.

Inflation rate is correlated to g-shocks because of 𝑘𝑥𝑡 term in the (3b). Output gap is correlated
to u-shocks because of 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 term in the (3a). Macroeconomists usually assumed the

innovations 𝜀 and 𝜂 of g-shocks and u-shocks are i.i.d. for simplicity and based on the
𝑓

𝑓

specification of g-shocks and u-shocks. For 𝜀𝑡 : 𝑔𝑡 ≡ 𝐸𝑡 𝑦�𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1 and 𝑦 𝑓 is the flexible-price
𝑓

output. 𝑦𝑡 is derived and determined from Calvo’s model of price stickiness, which output is

determined by labor input and aggregate productivity disturbance (See Walsh 2003, p.234 and
p.244).1 For 𝜂𝑡 : 𝑢𝑡 is assumed, unless it is permanent, to ultimately affect only the price level, it
is called price shock (See Walsh 2003, pp.253-4). It is reasonable to assume that 𝜀 and 𝜂 are

uncorrelated: 𝜎𝜀𝜀 = 0. The productivity disturbance 𝜀 and price shock 𝜂 do not necessarily have

correlation because productivity related to innovation and R&D and price shock can be arbitrary
and pure nominal phenomenon which has no real impact to productivity.

The third step is obtaining the general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in equations (3). It starts with

substituting 𝑖𝑡 by (2) in (3a), according to the assumption and the suggestion from Walsh (2003)

that the central bank commits to the simple Taylor rule (2), and apply the method of

We can have a simplifying assumption for having common degree of serial correlation 𝜌 = 𝜆 in order to construct
an example. For the details of the discussion of serial correlation, see Woodford (2003, pp.514-7).

15
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undetermined coefficients by setting 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 as functions of g-shocks and u-shocks with
undetermined coefficients:

and

𝑥𝑡 = 𝑎1 (𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 ) + 𝑎2 (𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 )

(4a)

𝜋𝑡 = 𝑏1 (𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 ) + 𝑏2 (𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 ),

(4b)

where 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are undetermined coefficients. The solutions of these undetermined

coefficients have the values which 𝑎1 = − (𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎⁄𝛹1 , 𝑎2 = 𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ⁄𝛹2 , 𝑏1 = 𝑘𝑘⁄𝛹1 , and

𝑏2 = − (𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )⁄𝛹2 , where 𝛹1 = 𝛽𝜆2 𝜎 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛽𝛽𝜑𝑥 − 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝜑𝜋 − 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥 and
𝛹2 = 𝛽𝜌2 𝜎 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛽𝛽𝜑𝑥 − 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥 . 𝛹1 ≠ 0 and 𝛹2 ≠ 0 are required. I

will discuss the properties of 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 later in this section. Then substituting these analytical

values into equations (4), we obtain the general solutions of the baseline new Keynesian model:

and

(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎
𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋
𝑔𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡
𝛹1
𝛹2

(5a)

𝑘𝑘
𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥
𝑔𝑡 + �−
� 𝑢𝑡 .
𝛹1
𝛹2

(5b)

𝑥𝑡 = −

𝜋𝑡 =

Appendix 2.5.4 provides Maple commands for a quick review of the derivations of (4) and (5).

In step 4, I assume the central bank’s objective is to minimize a loss function that balances
inflation stability against output gap variability (e.g., Walsh (2003, p.533)). Commitment to the
simple Taylor rule implies that the central bank adjusts its interest rate in response to 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡

in each period (see equation (2)) in response to realized shocks. Furthermore, since I use only 𝑥𝑡
and 𝜋𝑡 in Taylor rules instead of using 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 (i.e., the difference between price levels
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in two periods) in Taylor rules, the Taylor rules do not cause optimal inertia. 16 In other words,
the Fed has once-and-for-all response to the new development in either 𝑥𝑡 or 𝜋𝑡 , or both. Such
new developments are either from realized output gap shocks or inflation rate shocks or both.

The monetary policy objective function is then treated as a periodically quadratic social welfare
loss function for two target variables and their coefficients because the solution expectation for
all periods is the same as the solution for period t. The symbolic expression of the periodically
expected quadratic loss function is:
1
𝐿 = 𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2 ],
2

where E is the expectational operator and 𝛤 is the weights on output gap. 17 I treat 𝛤 as a

(6)

structure parameter 18 reflecting the society’s preference. Substituting the right-hand side of
equations (5a-b) into (6) for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 and taking expectation, we obtain the social welfare loss

expressed as a function of the variances of 𝑔𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 , i.e., 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝜂2 , and 𝜎𝜀𝜀 = 0 for simplicity,
as

2

(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎
1 𝑘𝑘 2
𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 2 2
𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 2 2
𝐿 = ��� � 𝜎𝜀2 + �
� 𝜎𝜂 )� + 𝛤 ��
� 𝜎𝜀2 + �
� 𝜎𝜂 ��
2 𝛹1
𝛹2
𝛹1
𝛹2
16

See Marest and Thurston (2017) for Taylor rules include price level, “global” optimum and optimal inertia.

17

The reason I use (6) instead of a social welfare loss function includes some lifecycle of outcome variabilities like
the one in Chapter 1 section 1.3 equation (7), which is also shown in the previous section (section 2.1) on page 26,
because the results in Chapter 2 are prepared and will be applied to the Chapter 3 in a case when a central bank
commit to the simple Taylor rule (2) in the beginning of the period t but he cannot adjust interest rate for
unobservable shocks when he sets up the interest rate in the beginning of the period t. To be consistent with the
study in the Chapter 3, I use a period quadratic loss function same as the one I will use in the Chapter 3.

18

See Walsh (2003, p.555): 𝛤 is a ratio of deep parameters, 𝛤 = �

(1−𝜔)(1−𝜔𝜔)
𝜔

(𝜎+𝜂)

� �(1+𝜂𝜂)𝜃�, in Walsh’s notation, which

reflects risk aversion σ, demand elasticity η, markup θ from output, discount rate 𝛽 and fraction (1-ω) of all firms’
optimally adjusting price each period.
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(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )2 2
1 (𝑘 2 + 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 )(𝜎)2 2
= ��
� 𝜎𝜀 + �
� 𝜎𝜂 �.
2
𝛹12
𝛹22

(7)

I then determine the “optimal” values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 for the extremum of 𝐿 in (7) by using the
first partial derivative test. The first partial derivatives with respect to 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 of (7) are
[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ) 2
𝜕𝜕
=�
� 𝜎𝜂
𝜕𝜑𝑥
𝛹23
2

�(𝑘𝑘)2 + Γ�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎� � (𝛽𝜆 − 1)
+�
� 𝜎𝜀2
3
𝛹1

and

(8a)

[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) 2
𝜕𝜕
= �−
� 𝜎𝜂
𝜕𝜑𝜋
𝛹23
+ �−

2

�(𝑘𝑘)2 + 𝛤�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎� � 𝑘
𝛹13

� 𝜎𝜀2 .

(8b)

Equations (8a) and (8b) tell us how much changes in social welfare loss from the changes in 𝜑𝑥

and 𝜑𝜋 .

According to the first partial derivative test, the extremum happens when 𝐿𝜑𝑥 (𝜑𝑥 , 𝜑𝜋 ) = 0

and 𝐿𝜑𝜋 (𝜑𝑥 , 𝜑𝜋 ) = 0, and the point (𝜑𝑥∗ , 𝜑𝜋∗ ) is called a stationary point for being the extremum
of L in (7). Let equations (8a) and (8b) jointly equal to zero, I have the simultaneous equation
for deriving the stationary point (𝜑𝑥∗ , 𝜑𝜋∗ )

2

�(𝑘𝑘)2 + Γ�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎� � (𝛽𝛽 − 1)
⎧ [𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ) 2
�
�
𝜎
+
�
� 𝜎𝜀2 = 0 — (9𝑎)
𝜂
⎪
𝛹23
𝛹13
⎪
2
⎨ [𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜑 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌)
�(𝑘𝑘)2 + 𝛤�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎� � 𝑘
𝑥
𝜋
𝑥
2
⎪
� 𝜎𝜂 + �−
� 𝜎𝜀2 = 0 — (9𝑏)
⎪�
𝛹23
𝛹13
⎩
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.

𝑘

Multiplying (𝛽𝛽−1) on the both sides of (9a)

2

�(𝑘𝑘)2 + Γ�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎� � 𝑘
[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ) 2
𝑘
⎧
�
�
�
�
𝜎
+
�
� 𝜎𝜀2 = 0 — (9𝑐)
𝜂
⎪
𝛹23
𝛹13
⎪ (𝛽𝛽 − 1)
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩

�

[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝛹23

� 𝜎𝜂2 + �−

2

�(𝑘𝑘)2 + 𝛤�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎� � 𝑘
𝛹13

� 𝜎𝜀2 = 0 — (9𝑏)

and then adding up (9c) and (9b), I obtain the equation
[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )
𝑘
��
�
��
(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
𝛹23

[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌)
�� 𝜎𝜂2 = 0 — (10).
+�
𝛹23

Equation (10) is solved for 𝜑𝜋 as a function of 𝜑𝑥 :

[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )
𝑘
�
��
�
(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
𝛹23
+�

�

[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝛹23

�=0

𝑘
� {[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )}
(𝛽𝛽 − 1)

+ {[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌)} = 0

𝑘
[𝑘(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )(𝛽𝛽 − 1)] ��
� (𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ) + (𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌)� = 0
(𝛽𝛽 − 1)

therefore, I derive two possible coefficient relationships between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 either from the first

square bracket of the left-hand side of equation,
𝜑𝜋 = −

𝑘
𝑘𝑘(𝜌 − 1)
𝜑𝑥 +
+𝜌
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)

(11a)
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,

or from the second square bracket of the left-hand side of equation,
(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 = (1 − 𝜌)(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎.

(11𝑏)

These two possible relationships each will produce a set of stationary point (𝜑𝑥∗ , 𝜑𝜋∗ ), but only
(11a) is valid because (11b) violates the NKM determinacy condition, (𝜑𝜋 − 1)𝑘 +

(1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0, for being an negative value 19 in the right-hand side. The valid linear

relationship (11a) is the constraint for determining the values of the coefficients in the simple
Taylor rule (2).
Next I determine 𝜑𝑥∗ and 𝜑𝜋∗ by using (11a) and (11b). Substituting (11a) into (11b) and

solving (11b) for 𝜑𝑥 , I obtain
𝜑𝑥∗ = (𝜌 − 1)𝜎.

(12)

𝜑𝜋∗ = 𝜌. 20

(13)

Substituting (12) into (11a) and solving (11a) for 𝜑𝜋 , I obtain
Substituting (12) and (13) into (7), and note that
�

(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )2 2
� 𝜎𝜂
𝛹22

from the second square bracket of (7) can be further simplified and factored as:

19

Rearrange the NKM determinacy condition:
(𝜑𝜋 − 1)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0
⟹ (𝜑𝜋 − 1 + 𝜌 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0
⟹ (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 + (𝜌 − 1)𝑘 + (𝛽𝛽 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0
⟹ (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > (1 − 𝜌)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜆)𝜑𝑥 > 0,
but (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 = (1 − 𝜌)(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎 < 0,
therefore (11b) is invalid.

(if 𝜑𝑥 > 0)

To verify (12) and (13), I substitute (12) into (11b) and solve (11b) for 𝜑𝜋 , which I obtain the same solution of 𝜑𝜋
as (13).
20

38

2

�(𝜌 − 1)𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 � + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )2

0

�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)[(𝜌 − 1)𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 ] + 𝑘(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )�

2,

so it becomes 0 when 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are substituted out by 𝜑𝑥∗ = (𝜌 − 1)𝜎 and 𝜑𝜋∗ = 𝜌 at the same
time. I obtain the extremum of the social welfare loss:
(𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2
0 2
𝜎𝜂 +
𝜎𝜀2 .
2
0
2�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘� (𝜌 − 𝜆)2

(14)

However, the above extreme is not possible to achieve because 𝜑𝑥∗ and 𝜑𝜋∗ cannot be applied to
the simple Taylor rule (2). Substitute (12) and (13) into the NKM determinacy condition,
(𝜑𝜋 − 1)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0, I obtain
because

and

(𝜌 − 1)𝜎(1 − 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜌 − 1) > 0,
(𝜌 − 1)𝜎(1 − 𝛽) < 0
𝑘(𝜌 − 1) < 0,

therefore, 𝜑𝑥∗ and 𝜑𝜋∗ cannot both be the coefficient values of the simple Taylor rule (2) at the

same time for governing the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 . This can be proved by substituting (12)

and (13) into (5a) and (5b) for obtaining the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 , and I obtain no result for

𝜋𝑡 because of division by zero. Since (12) and (13) are derived from (11a) and (11b), this

unfortunate result is obvious because (11b) violates the NKM determinacy condition. Thus, (11a)
is the only linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 which produces a set of stationary point for obtaining
the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 when the simple Taylor rule (2) is specified as the optimal Taylor

rule. For example, I can obtain the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 by substituting (11a) and (12) into

(5a) for optimal 𝑥𝑡 :
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𝑥𝑡 = −

𝑘
𝜎(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
𝑢
−
𝑔,
𝑡
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(𝑘 + 𝜎 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2

and by substituting (11a) and (12) into (5b) for optimal 𝜋𝑡 :
𝜋𝑡 =

𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽)
𝑘𝑘
𝑢
+
𝑔.
𝑡
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(𝑘 + 𝜎 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2

(15)

(16)

In addition, I can obtain the extremum of social welfare loss by substituting (11a) and (12) into
(7):
(𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2
1
𝛤
2
�𝜎 +
𝜎 2.
𝐿= �
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂 2�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘�2 (𝜌 − 𝜆)2 𝜀

(17)

With this, I complete the derivation.

A Numerical Experiment:

This experiment shows that the minimum L occurs when the points on L is satisfied by
(11a). Note the previous analysis is based on equations (5a-b). Since equations (5a-b) have the
same expressions as the case involve the particular Taylor rule 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 with
𝜑𝑔 = 0, for comparison purpose, this experiment is conducted based on the case involve the

particular Taylor rule. I will show that (11a) holds for different values of 𝜑𝑔 . In Figure 2.1, the
values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are plotted along the horizontal axis and the values of L are plotted along

the vertical axis. The value of 𝜑𝑔 is presumed to equal 𝜎 for nullifying g-shocks. The parameter

values used in Figure 2.1 are 𝑘 = 0.03, 𝛽 = 0.99, Γ = 0.05, 𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.9, and 𝜌 = 0.9. The
shocks are assumed to be unity so 𝜎𝜀2 = 1 and 𝜎𝜂2 = 1. The social welfare loss (which has the

𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 built in) is the yellow surface with contours, which is
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𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃

2

𝑘�𝜎 − 𝜑𝑔 �
1
𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 2 2
2
= ���
� 𝜎𝜀 + �
� 𝜎𝜂 )�
2
𝛹1
𝛹2
2

(𝛽𝛽 − 1)(𝜎 − 𝜑𝑔 )
𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 2 2
2
+ 𝛤 ��
� 𝜎𝜀 + �
� 𝜎𝜂 ��
𝛹1
𝛹2
2

—i.e.,

(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )2 2
1 (𝑘 2 + 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 )�𝜎 − 𝜑𝑔 �
2
= ��
� 𝜎𝜀 + �
� 𝜎𝜂 �
2
𝛹12
𝛹22
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃 =

(−0.1 − 𝜑𝑥 )2
0.025(0.9 − 𝜑𝜋 )2
1
+
�
�,
(0.0161 − 0.109𝜑𝑥 − 0.03𝜑𝜋 )2 2 (0.0161 − 0.109𝜑𝑥 − 0.03𝜑𝜋 )2

where the subscript PTR denotes the particular Taylor rule—i.e., 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 .

Note that the difference between (7) and 𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃 is that the coefficient term on the 𝜎𝜀2 has (𝜎)2 with
2

the simple Taylor rule and the coefficient term on the 𝜎𝜀2 has �𝜎 − 𝜑𝑔 � with the particular

Taylor rule. In other words, we can treat the case with the simple Taylor rule has the same

welfare loss as the case with the particular Taylor rule with the particular Taylor rule and 𝜑𝑔 = 0.
The green, bottom plane of the social welfare loss has the (11a) and 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 built in, which is

—i.e.,

1
𝛤
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �
� 𝜎2
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 16.73304106,

where the subscript PTR denotes particular Taylor rule and the subscript min denotes minimum
value. The grey plane is tracing out (11a)—i.e.,
𝜑𝜋 = 1.450458716 + 5.504587156𝜑𝑥 .
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In other words, (11a) is the line where the yellow, top surface tangent to the green, bottom plane.
So when (11a) is satisfied, L is minimized.
Figure 2.1. The Optimal Constraint of 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅

Does different values of 𝜑𝑔 change the relationship between minimum L and (11a)? Put it

differently, does minimum L occurs according to (11a) when g-shocks are not nullified? Does
the value of 𝜑𝑔 affect the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 ? No, the value of 𝜑𝑔 does not affect

42

the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 . This is because (11a) can be derived directly from solving
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜑𝑥

𝜕𝜕

= 0 and 𝜕𝜑 = 0 together for 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 . Recall that Figure 2.1 has 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 built in, so I
𝜋

first produce three additional plots with different values of 𝜑𝑔 built in for comparing with Figure
2.1. Figure 2.2 shows the results of the comparison for four different values of 𝜑𝑔 , (a) has

𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 = 1, (b) has 𝜑𝑔 = 0, (c) has 𝜑𝑔 > 𝜎—i.e., 𝜑𝑔 = 2, and (d) has 𝜑𝑔 < 𝜎—i.e., 𝜑𝑔 = 0.5.

In addition, Figure 2.2(a) implies optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 . Figure 2.2(b) implies the policyrate path is based on the simple Taylor rule, 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 . All four sub-figures have the

same result that the grey plane is tracing out (11a) where the yellow, above surface tangents to
the green, below plane which has (11a) built in.
It is clear that (11a) holds whether 𝑔𝑡 is nullified by 𝜑𝑔 or not. To make it more

convincing, Appendix 2.5.5 shows the results of 2-D plots that minimum L occurs where the
points satisfied (11a) on L (7) by using different parametrization (𝑘 = 0.03, 𝛽 = 0.99, 𝛤 =

0.05, 𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.3, 𝜌 = 0.7, 𝜎𝜀2 = 1 and 𝜎𝜂2 = 1) for the case involving the simple Taylor rule.

43

Figure 2.2. The Optimal Constraint of 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 with Different Values of 𝝋𝒈
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2.2.1 The Validity of (11a) for the Optimal Simple Taylor Rule
I now consider the validity of (11a) for optimal policy—the optimal equilibrium relationship
between 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in equations (3). For (2) to be a policy rule, it must satisfy the NKM

determinacy condition. Do (11a) satisfy the NKM determinacy condition? Since (11a) is
derived based on the values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 , we should start from equation (5a-b). The

denominators 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 in equation (5a-b) must be non-zero values, so the values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡
are defined by the right-hand sides of equation (5a-b). Therefore, 𝛹1 can be rearranged as
1 − 𝛽𝛽
𝜎
�� + � (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝛽 − 1)� − 𝜆� 𝑘.
��𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 �
𝑘
𝑘

(18)

The terms in the first square bracket is similar to the determinacy condition of the baseline new
Keynesian model, 𝜑𝑥 (1 − 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) > 0. The NKM determinacy condition implies that

𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 �

1−𝛽
𝑘

1−𝛽𝛽

� > 1, and since �

𝑘

1−𝛽

�≥�

𝑘

�, we know that the value of the first square

bracket is greater than one when the determinacy condition is satisfied. 21 The value of the
second square bracket is always positive. 22 Thus (18) shows that 𝛹1 > 0 when the determinacy
condition is satisfied. The difference between 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 is that 𝛹1 includes the serial
1−𝛽

𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 � � > 1 do not imply that 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 both have to be positive. First, the derivation of it from the
𝑘
NKM determinacy condition does not require that 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 both have to be positive, which is shown below,
𝜑𝑥 (1 − 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) > 0,
𝜑𝑥 (1 − 𝛽) > −𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1),
𝜑𝑥 (1 − 𝛽) > 𝑘(−𝜑𝜋 + 1),
(1 − 𝛽)
> −𝜑𝜋 + 1,
𝜑𝑥
𝑘
(1 − 𝛽)
𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥
> 1.
𝑘
1−𝛽
Second, 𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 � � > 1 is satisfied by having either 𝜑𝑥 < 0 or 𝜑𝜋 < 0, see Appendix 2.5.7 for a plot
𝑘
illustration.
21

22

(𝜆 − 1) < 0 and (𝛽𝛽 − 1) < 0, so (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝛽 − 1) > 0.
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correlation parameter 𝜆 and 𝛹2 includes the serial correlation parameter 𝜌. The same conclusion
also applies to 𝛹2 . Now, substituting (11a) into the NKM determinacy condition and the

condition for the optimal simple Taylor rule is then determined by
𝜑x >

(𝜌 − 1)(−𝛽 2 𝜆2 𝜎 + (𝑘𝑘 + 2𝜆𝜆)𝛽 − 𝑘 − 𝜎)

(𝜆𝜆 − 1)2
, if 𝛽 < 1 +
𝜌𝜌 − 1

(𝜌 − 1)(−𝛽 2 𝜆2 𝜎 + (𝑘𝑘 + 2𝜆𝜆)𝛽 − 𝑘 − 𝜎)

(𝜆𝜆 − 1)2
.
𝜌𝜌 − 1

�(−𝜆2 + 𝜌)𝛽 − 𝜌 + 2𝜆 − 1�𝛽

or
𝜑x <

�(−𝜆2 + 𝜌)𝛽 − 𝜌 + 2𝜆 − 1�𝛽

, if 𝛽 > 1 +

These two inequalities has an important implication when I determine whether the extremum is a
minimum as the result I want to have for the social welfare loss (7) or a maximum which is an
unwanted result for the social welfare loss (7). The implication is found when the common
degree of serial correlation 𝜌 = 𝜆 is assumed and these two inequalities is simplified as

or

𝜑𝑥 > 𝜌𝜌 −

𝑘+𝜎
, if 𝜌 > 1
𝛽

𝜑𝑥 < 𝜌𝜌 −

𝑘+𝜎
, if 𝜌 < 1.
𝛽

Since the value of serial correlation 𝜌 is between zero and one, I obtain an interesting condition

for the paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 to be unique, existent, and optimal under the commitment to the
optimal simple Taylor rule as
𝜑𝑥 < 𝜌𝜌 −

𝑘+𝜎
.
𝛽

(19)
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It is easy to see that the value of 𝜑𝑥 in (19) is always negative. 23 In other words, when the

common degree of serial correlations are the same, i.e., 𝜌 = 𝜆, the value of 𝜑𝑥 must be negative

for having the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 under the commitment to the optimal simple Taylor

rule. 24 In the next section, I will apply the implication for determining the limit value of L in (7)
is at the minimum.
We can also easily observe from (18) that 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 are positively affected by higher 𝜑𝑥

and 𝜑𝜋 , if only (11a) is satisfied and 𝛤 is assumed to be positive. 25 This observation implies that

at least there is the limit value of 𝐿 in (7) as either 𝜑𝑥 or 𝜑𝜋 approaches infinity. If this limit

value is the same value when the economy is at its optimality, it suggests that the extremum of
the loss function by commitment to the simple Taylor rule may only have a limit and does not
have an unconstrained solution when the economy is not at its optimality. Does the value of L at
the stationary point (𝜑𝑥∗ , 𝜑𝜋∗ ) in (7) constitute a minimum, or at least, is its limit a minimum?

This is the question of determining the extremum a minimum or a maximum using the second
partial derivative test. Here we turn to Section 2.3 for determining the extremum of L in (7). In
addition, Section 2.3 will discuss the efficiency in terms of the extremum of the loss function
under both the commitment to the simple Taylor rule using the general-solution approach and
under the three-term Taylor rule using the common approach.

23

24

𝜌𝜌 −

𝑘+𝜎
𝛽

1

= �𝜌 − � 𝜎 −
𝛽

𝑘

𝛽

1

< 0 because 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝜌 < 1 and �𝜌 − � < 0.
𝛽

This condition is consistent with the Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1.

This is no longer the case under the optimal simple Taylor rule (2) and the relation of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 implied by (19)
is therefore not applied. This is the case which demand shocks are not neutralized completely and cause the output
gap and inflation to fluctuate inefficiently, see Walsh (2003, p.549) for details.

25
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2.3 The Efficiency of Monetary Policy Under Commitment to the Simple
Taylor Rule
The second partial derivative test shows that the second-order sufficient condition of (7) equal to
𝜕2 𝐿

𝜕2 𝐿

𝜕2 𝐿

zero, i.e., 𝜕𝜑2 ∗ 𝜕𝜑2 − �𝜕𝜑
𝑥

𝜋

𝑥 𝜕𝜑𝜋

2

� = 0. The details of the result of the second partial derivative

test are in the Appendix 2.5.6. This implies the stationary value of L can be a relative minimum,
a relative maximum or a saddle point. This section I show how to determine the extremum at
stationary points. When the three-term Taylor rule (1) is implemented to the baseline new
Keynesian model and g-shocks are nullified by having 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎, the minimum social welfare loss

function is a function of 𝜎𝜂2 , i.e.,
𝛤
1
� 𝜎𝜂2 ,
𝐿0 = �
2
2
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1) + 𝑘

as Thurston (2010, 2012) shows which is an unconstrained solution. We can get the similar

(20)

result of minimized loss function from (7). Substituting (11a) into the right hand side of (7) for
𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 , I obtain the extremum of the loss function L1 under the commitment to the simple

Taylor rule,

1 (Γ(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2 2 1
𝛤
𝐿1 = �
�
𝜎
+
�
� 𝜎𝜂2 ,
𝜀
2
2
2
2
𝐷
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1) + 𝑘
𝑘

where 𝐷 = 𝑘 �− Γ(𝛽𝛽−1) 𝜑𝑥 +

𝑘𝑘(𝜌−1)

Γ(𝛽𝛽−1)

(21)

+ 𝜌� + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 + (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘𝑘.

The difference between (20) and (21) is because the three-term Taylor rule (1) neutralizes
the effect of 𝑔𝑡 while the simple Taylor rule (2) does not. On the other hand, for the case of
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commitment to the simple Taylor rule, although the simple Taylor rule (2) includes the optimal
linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 (11a), it cannot neutralize the effect of 𝑔𝑡 .
Second, from the previous section we learn 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 are positively affected by higher 𝜑𝑥

and 𝜑𝜋 . Set the limit of L (7), as 𝜑𝜋 is approaching infinity by letting 𝜑𝑥 approach infinity
according to (11a), shown by the following equation:
2

(𝑘𝑘)2 + 𝛤�(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎�
(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )2 2
1
2
𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐿 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙 ��
�
𝜎
+
�
� 𝜎𝜂 �
𝜀
𝜑𝜋 →∞
2 𝜑𝜋→∞
𝛹12
𝛹22
=

(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )2 2
1
𝑙𝑙𝑙 ��
� 𝜎𝜂 �.
2 𝜑𝜋→∞
𝛹22

Using the 𝐿’𝐻𝑜�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝’s rule twice, we obtain the limit of (22):
1
𝛤
� 𝜎 2.
𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐿 = �
𝜑𝜋 →∞
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂

The same result of (23) can be derived by taking the limit of L1 (21) as 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are

(22)

(23)

approaching infinity.

(𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2 2 1
1
𝛤
𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐿1 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
�
𝜎
+
𝑙𝑙𝑙
�
� 𝜎2
𝜀
𝜑𝜋 →∞
2 𝜑𝜋→∞
𝐷2
2 𝜑𝜋→∞ 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂
=

1
𝛤
�
� 𝜎2.
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂

(24)

In other words, jointly, when the optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule (i.e.,

(11a)) is met and these 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are approaching infinity according to (11a), L1 is approaching
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L0. Figure 2.3 illustrates this property 26 of optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 with arbitrary parameter
values that 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99, Γ = 2, 𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝜌 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜀2 = 1 and 𝜎𝜂2 = 1.

To determine (24) is a minimum, I compare (24) and (21) for all 𝜑𝑥 > −∞. The logic 27 is

as follow: once I determine the function 𝐿 = 𝐿(𝜑𝑥∗ , 𝜑𝜋∗ ) and 𝜑𝜋∗ = 𝑓(𝜑𝑥∗ ) according to (11a), I

can write 𝐿 = 𝐿(𝜑𝑥∗ , 𝑓(𝜑𝑥∗ )) = 𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗ ). Also let 𝐿�(−∞) is the symbolic expression when the

value of equation (21) is at 𝜑𝑥 approaching infinity. If 𝐿�(−∞) < 𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗ ) for all 𝜑𝑥 ∈ (−∞, ∞),

𝐿�(−∞) is the minimum. 𝐿�(−∞) is determined by (24) with the assumption of 𝜌 = 𝜆 so (19) is
applied for having a negative 𝜑𝑥 . Thus,

𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗ ) is identified by (21):

𝐿�(−∞) =

𝛤
1
�
� 𝜎2.
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂

𝛤
1 (Γ(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2 2 1
𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗ ) = �
� 𝜎𝜀 + �
� 𝜎2.
2
2
𝐷
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂

𝜑𝑥 is only in the first bracket of the right-hand side of (21) associated with D and the value of the

first bracket is always positive for all 𝜑𝑥 > −∞ because the terms in the first bracket are squared
except Γ. Thus, (24) is a minimum because 𝐿�(−∞) < 𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗ ). Furthermore, since 𝐿�(−∞) = 𝐿0,

we learn that the three-term Taylor rule (1) is more efficient than the simple Taylor rule although

In Chapter 3, I will apply this property of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case which the central bank commit to the simple
Taylor rule but its target variables (output gap and inflation) cannot be observed at the time when the decision must
be made by the central bank.
26

27

I would like to thank Professor Wim Vijverberg for pointing out this logic to me. All the errors of this approach
are mine.
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nullifying g-shocks is not necessary for the specification of the optimal Taylor rule for governing
the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 with the linear relationship (11a) of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 .
Figure 2.3. L1 Approaches L0

2.4 Conclusion
This paper shows how to derive the linear relationship of the 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule
and studies the properties of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 under the commitment to the

simple Taylor rule (2). In summary, the steps of the derivations of the optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and

𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule are as follows:

(1) Specify the simple Taylor rule, which is an instrument rule;
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(2) Assume that the central bank commits to the simple Taylor rule, therefore, we
substitute the simple Taylor rule into NK-IS for 𝑖𝑡 ;

(3) Derive Thurston’s (2010,2012) general solutions of target variables output gap and
inflation rate;
(4) Specify the policy objective function as a loss function described by periodical
weighted sum of the variances of the general solutions of output gap and inflation.
Periodical because interest rate is adjusted period-by-period according to the values of
𝑥 and 𝜋 in each period;

(5) Derive the optimal linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule by using
the first partial derivative test;

(6) Determine the limit of optimal L (as expressed by equation (24)) at 𝜑𝑥 approaching

infinity is a minimum by comparing it with the optimal L (as expressed by equation
(21)) for all 𝜑𝑥 ∈ (−∞, ∞).

I then find the optimal linear relationship between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 under the commitment to the

simple Taylor rule is the same as the one under the three-term Taylor rules.

When 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 approach infinity, the limit value of the central-bank loss function under

the commitment to the simple Taylor is the same as the minimized loss function under the threeterm Taylor rule. Note that I am not suggesting that the Fed can force 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 to approach

infinity. It is only for the comparison purpose not for the practical reason by letting 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋
approach infinity when we want to know the performance of different Taylor rules. When the
performance of a Taylor rule is improved, the minimized social welfare loss containing such
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Taylor rule will be reduced and move close to the minimized social welfare loss containing the
three-term Taylor rule. I will discuss this application in details in Chapter 3.

2.5 Appendixes
2.5.1 Deriving the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅
Using the optimal paths of output gap,

and inflation rate,

𝑥𝑡 = −

𝜋𝑡 =

𝑘
𝑢,
𝑘 2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡

𝛤
𝑢
𝑘 2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡

for the discretionary case from Thurston (2010, 2012), 28 and let
𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎

for nullifying g-shocks, the current output gap and inflation rate is then only affected by u-

28

These optimal paths are derived by using the first order condition
𝑘
𝑥𝑡 = − 𝜋𝑡 ,
𝛤
which is the marginal rate of substitution for each period between output gap and inflation in the social welfare loss
function,
∞
1
2
2
],
+ 𝛤𝑥𝑡+𝑖
𝐿 = � 𝛽 𝑖 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+𝑖
2
𝑖=1

and the forward looking expectation of inflation rate at steady state,
𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = 𝜌𝜋𝑡 .
𝑘
[𝜋
]
Substituting 𝑥𝑡 = − 𝜋𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡 into the Phillips equation 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] + 𝑢𝑡 , and solving for
𝛤
𝜋𝑡 , I obtain the optimal path of inflation rate for discretionary case:
𝛤
𝜋𝑡 = 2
𝑢.
𝑘 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
I then also obtain the optimal path of output gap for discretionary case:
𝑘
𝑥𝑡 = − 2
𝑢
𝑘 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
𝑘
by multiplying the optimal path of inflation rate by − .
𝛤
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shocks , so I can assume 𝐸𝑡 [𝑥𝑡+1 ] = 𝜌𝑥𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 [𝜋𝑡+1 ] = 𝜌𝜋𝑡 at steady state. Substituting all of
the above equations into the baseline new Keynesian IS equation described in Chapter 1 section
1.3, and applying the particular Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 ) described in Chapter 1
section 1.4,

𝜑𝜋 =

𝑘
𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝜌)
𝜑𝑥 +
+𝜌
𝛤
𝛤

is obtained by simplifying and rearranging the equation. 29

2.5.2 Deriving the (Pre-commitment) Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 in Maple

The Maple commands in italics for obtaining the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case of a
central bank’s commitment to the particular Taylor rule are as follow:
The NK-IS:

Note: EX is

and EP is

is an AR(1) process

, EX and EP are forward-looking variables. The demand shock,

,

.

The NKPC:
Note: The cost shock,

, is an AR(1) process

.

The particular Taylor Rule:
Solving Baseline NKM by Undetermined Coefficient Method :

29

1
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜌𝑥𝑡 − (𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜎𝑔𝑡 − 𝜌𝜋𝑡 )
𝜎
⟹ [(1 − 𝜌)𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥 ]𝑥𝑡 = (𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 )𝜋𝑡
−𝑘
𝛤
⟹ [(1 − 𝜌)𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥 ] � 2
� 𝑢𝑡 = (𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 ) � 2
�𝑢
𝑘 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽)
𝑘 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑡
⟹ [(1 − 𝜌)𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥 ]𝑘 = (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝛤
𝑘
𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝜌)
+ 𝜌.
⟹ 𝜑𝜋 = 𝜑𝑥 +
𝛤
𝛤
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Obtaining Optimal Loci of φs :
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2.5.3 The Messy Results of the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 in Maple

Figure 2.4 below is the screenshot of the messy result of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in
Maple:
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Figure 2.4. The Maple Result (1) of the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅

Maple produces the messy result of
the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 .

Figure 2.5 below is the screenshot which Maple produces no result for the linear
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 :
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Figure 2.5. The Maple Result (2) of the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅

Maple cannot produce the solution for
the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋

2.5.4 Deriving the General Solutions in Maple
This appendix shows the Maple commands for obtaining the general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 by

using the baseline NKM which has the simple Taylor rule. The Maple commands in italics for
the general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 are as follow:
In this case, the simple Taylor rule (STR) is

, which does not have φ[g] in it.

Baseline IS curve (BIS) expresses a NK-IS equation and is presented by (1) below:

Note: EX is
shock,

and EP is

, EX and EP are forward-looking variables. The demand

, is an AR(1) process

.

Baseline Philips curve (BPC) expresses a NK-PC equation and is presented by (2) below:
Note: The cost shock,

, is an AR(1) process

.

58

The simple Taylor Rule (STR) expresses a Taylor rule using actual values of x and π and is presented
by (3) below:

The undetermined coefficients equations of x and π are represented as (4) and (5) below:

Obtaining the general solutions of x and π by solving (4) and (5) using the Baseline NKM (1) and (2), and
the simple Taylor Rule (3) :
Equation (6) below shows x is updated one period ahead:

Equation (7) below shows π is updated one period ahead:

Equation (8) below shows g[t+1] and u[t+1] in (6) are replaced by λg[t]+ε[t+1] and ρu[t]+η[t+1]:

Equation (9) below shows g[t+1] and u[t+1] in (7) are replaced by λg[t]+ε[t+1] and ρu[t]+η[t+1]:

Equation (10) below shows the undetermined coefficient equation of EX in the Baseline NKM:
Note: The expected values of

and

are equal to zero.

Equation (11) below shows the undetermined coefficient equation of EP in the Baseline NKM:
Note: The expected values of

and

are equal to zero.

Equation (12) below shows the x and π in STR (3) are replaced by (6) and (7):

Equation (13) below shows x, i, EX and EP in Baseline IS (1) are replaced by (6), (12), (10) and (11):
Equation (14) below shows x, π and EP in Baseline Philips curve (2) are replaced by (6), (7) and (11):

Then I am able to solve (13) and (14) by the method of undetermined coefficient:
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Below is the general solution of x when the simple TR does not have φ[g] in it.
solx expresses the general solution of x:

Below is the general solution of π when the simple TR does not have φ[g] in it.
solp express the general solution of π:

To run the commands and produce equations (4) and equations (5) in Maple, simply copy and
paste all the commands into Maple and run the commands.

2.5.5 The Relationship between (11a) and minimum L: Illustrations from 2-D
Plots
I take 𝜑𝑥 fixed to the yellow surface and then increase 𝜑𝜋 to see where the minimum is, and I

reproduce the u-shaped curve with different values of 𝜑𝑥 . I also found the curve repeatedly
narrowed down the range of movement of 𝜑𝜋 . Note that because L is a fraction, there are

rounding problems in the results, the points where minimum L occurs can be a little off from the
predictive point as (11a) suggests.
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First is an example with 𝜑𝑥 = 2 and the Maple command:
Plot(subs(phi[x]=2, Lsimu1), phi[pi]=5.1..5.3)

The minimum is a little short off 𝜑𝜋 = 5.20. If I calculate the implied value by (11a), it is a little
bit off.

Third, I try the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝜋 to see where it crosses the zero line. The
Maple command and result are:

>
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Then inserted (11a)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 into the first derivative:
>

This is very close to zero.

Next I check the “inverse ridge” case for showing that (11a) is working in both directions. First I

rearrange (11a) to (11a’):

.
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Then the parameterization of (11a’) is

. I found a u-shaped

curve and repeatedly narrowed down the range of movement of 𝜑𝑥 . To be consistent with the
previous example of taking 𝜑𝑥 fixed to the yellow (unconstrained) surface, I chose 𝜑𝜋 =
5.195114006 as the inverse example and command:
>

The minimum is a little short of 𝜑𝑥 = 2.01. I then calculate the implied value by (11a’), it is a

bit off.

>
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Thirdly, I tried the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝑥 to see where it crosses the 0 line:
>

It seems like the 𝜑𝑥 crosses the 0 line a bit off 2.01. Then insert (11a’)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝑥
into the first derivative:

>

Again, this seems pretty close to zero.
Now, I repeat above steps using big value of 𝜑𝑥 for the example of taking 𝜑𝑥 fixed and big value
of 𝜑𝜋 for the inverse ridge example. First is an example with 𝜑𝑥 = 20 and command:

64

>

The minimum is between 𝜑𝜋 = 40.35 and 𝜑𝜋 = 40.4. If I calculate the implied value by (11a),

it is:

>

Then, I try the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝜋 to see where it crosses the zero line. The Maple
command and result are:

>
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Then insert (11a)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 into the first derivative:
>

The result −3.929585173 ∗ 10−7 is very close to zero. The predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 for taking 𝜑𝑥

fixed at big value is more accurate than the previous predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 for taking 𝜑𝑥 fixed at
small value.

Second is the inverse ridge example with 𝜑𝜋 = 40.37426710 and command:
>
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The minimum is a little bit short of 𝜑𝑥 = 20. I then calculate the implied value by (11a’), it is a
little bit off:

>

Then I try the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝑥 to see where it crosses the zero line:
>
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It seems like the 𝜑𝑥 crosses the zero line at 20. Then insert (11a’)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 into
the first derivative:

>

Again, this seems pretty close to zero.

Finally, I show a proof that (11a) is the condition for having a minimum loss of equation (7).
First, I pick 𝜑𝑥,𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 2 and treat it as exogenous. Then I derive the first derivative of equation
𝑑𝑑

(7) with respect to 𝜑𝜋 by substituting 𝜑𝑥,𝑚𝑚𝑚 into equation (7), i.e., 𝑑𝜑 :
𝜋
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>

𝑑𝑑

Second, I solve 𝑑𝜑 = 0 for minimizing 𝜑𝜋 and the Maple command:
𝜋

>

Third, I calculate predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 of (11a) when 𝜑𝑥 = 2:
>

The predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 is a bit off.
Next, I pick 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 2 and treat it as exogenous. Then I derive the first derivative of equation
𝑑𝑑

(7) with respect to 𝜑𝑥 by substituting 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 into equation (7), i.e., 𝑑𝜑 :
𝑥

>

𝑑𝑑

Then I solve 𝑑𝜑 = 0 for minimizing 𝜑𝑥 and the Maple command:
𝑥
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>

Finally, I calculate predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 of (11a) when 𝜑𝜋 = 2:
>

The predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 is a bit off.
So I pick 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 40 and repeat the above steps. The command is:
>

The predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 is still a bit off, but the two values of 𝜑𝑥 are more close to each other.
I then try a very big 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 200000. The command is:
>
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𝑑𝑑

The predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 is almost identical to the solution of 𝑑𝜑 = 0 for minimizing 𝜑𝑥 .
𝑥

I then check for negative value of 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 . The command is:
>

I also I then check for negative value of 𝜑𝑥,𝑚𝑚𝑚 . The command is:
>
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Two examples of negative values of 𝜑𝜋,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝜑𝑥,𝑚𝑚𝑚 also show that (11a) is the condition for
having a minimum loss of equation (7).

2.5.6 The Plot of 𝝋𝝅 + 𝝋𝒙

(𝟏−𝜷)
𝒌

>𝟏

The shadowed area is the area of the point (𝜑𝜋 , 𝜑𝑥 ) which satisfies 𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥

(1−𝛽)
𝑘

> 1.
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2.5.7 The Second Partial Derivative Test of the Social Welfare Loss (7)
Substituting (11a) into the second partial derivatives with respect to 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 , I obtain

and

(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 (𝛽𝛽 − 1)2
𝜕 2𝐿
=−
𝜎2
(−2 + (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝛽)3 (𝜌 − 𝜆)3 (𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 𝛽 3 𝜂
𝜕𝜑𝑥2

𝑘 2 (𝛽𝛽 − 1)4
𝜕 2𝐿
=
−
𝜎 2,
(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 (−2 + (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝛽)3 (𝜌 − 𝜆)3 (𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 𝛽 3 𝜂
𝜕𝜑𝜋2

and also substituting (11a) into the cross partial derivative with respect to 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 , I obtain
𝜕 2𝐿
𝑘(𝛽𝛽 − 1)3
=
𝜎 2 . 30
𝜕𝜑𝑥 𝜑𝜋 (−2 + (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝛽)3 (𝜌 − 𝜆)3 (𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥 )2 𝛽 3 𝜂
𝜕2 𝐿

𝜕2 𝐿

𝜕2 𝐿

If the stationary value of L is a relative minimum, the value of 𝜕𝜑2 ∗ 𝜕𝜑2 − �𝜕𝜑
𝜕2 𝐿

𝜕2 𝐿

𝜕2 𝐿

positive. However, the value of 𝜕𝜑2 ∗ 𝜕𝜑2 − �𝜕𝜑
𝑥

30

𝜋

𝑥 𝜕𝜑𝜋

2

𝑥

𝜋

𝑥 𝑑𝜑𝜋

2

� must be

� from the above derivatives equals zero.

g-shocks are nullified for the simplicity of the expression of equations.
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3

USING MONEY SIGNALS TO IMPROVE TAYLOR RULE
PERFORMANCE IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL
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Abstract
This chapter is the study of a combination monetary policy rule where the central bank
(“the Fed”) sets the interest rate before observing current shocks of output gap (𝑥𝑡 ) and inflation
(𝜋𝑡 ). The missing information is 𝜀𝑡 in the shock term of 𝑥𝑡 equation—i.e., 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 +

𝜀𝑡 where 𝜀𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜀2 ), and 𝜂𝑡 in the shock term of 𝜋𝑡 equation—i.e., 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 +

𝜂𝑡 where 𝜂𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 �0, 𝜎𝜂2 �. Thus, the Fed cannot adjust their interest rate for those shocks
because the Fed cannot observe 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . On the other hand, the information of money is

immediately available to the Fed when I use a model as the abstract representation of the Fed’s
observation of money surprise, so the Fed can use signals about money to adjust their interest
rate. My model of the Fed’s operation on how they observe money surprise is a simplified
model for making a theoretical point, not for the purpose of improving what the Fed is actually
doing. The combination policy of a Taylor rule and money signal can improve the social welfare
loss when the Fed sets their monetary policy with unobservable shocks. Chapter 3 uses an
inverted version of Poole’s (1970) combination policy analysis and shows that the social welfare
loss is improved from the money signals.
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3.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I discuss the mechanism of the baseline new Keynesian monetary
model (“NKM”) for the analysis of monetary policy and potentially the performance of monetary
policy. Conventionally speaking, the baseline NKM has a full-information Taylor rule built in
and all the shocks are assumed to be known when a central bank (“the Fed”) sets its monetary
policy, as well as the model parameters, so it is less complicated for not using money demand
and supply analysis. CGG (1999) argues that (a): “Using observable intermediate targets, such
as broad money aggregates are a possibility, but experience suggests that these indirect indicators
are generally too unstable to be used in practice.” (CGG 1999, p.1686) (b): “Large unobservable
shocks to money demand produce high volatility of interest rates when a monetary aggregate is
used as the policy instrument. It is largely for this reason that an interest rate instrument may be
preferable.” (CGG 1999, p.1687) Their two arguments are based on their summary that the
policy results are the same whether the Fed uses a money-based or interest rate based model.
There is no necessary choice between money based on interest rate or interest rate based on
money. (CGG 1999, p.1667) 31

However when the Fed only has limited observation about target variables—i.e., output
gaps and inflation rates—, the Fed cannot adjust their interest rate for the missing information in
those target variables because they cannot observe them. Basically the missing information is

31

If the shocks are fully observed then it does not matter whether the monetary policy model is money based on
interest rate or interest rate based on money. I am not claiming that high volatility of interest rates is a bad thing. In
this context the only thing those authors did not prefer about monetary aggregate policy is that it requires more
information and is more complicated.
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the components of output gap and inflation and those are not observed, so using a Taylor rule the
Fed is not able to respond to those components of output gap and inflation. For example,
observed target variables cannot take into account of unobservable shocks and estimated target
variables are simply ignore the unobservable shocks. Obviously Taylor rule performance will be
worse if the Fed has limited information about 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 . In this chapter I want to know how the

Fed can improve the performance of limited-information Taylor rule.

William Poole (1970) proposed a combination policy when a certain relationship was
maintained between interest rate and money stock using a fixed-price, IS-LM model:
�

𝑦 = 𝑎0 − 𝑎1 𝑖 + 𝜖𝑦
,
𝑦 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑀 + 𝑏2 𝑖 + 𝜖𝑚

where 𝑦 is output, 𝑖 is interest rate, 𝑀 is money, 𝜖𝑦 is output shock and 𝜖𝑚 is money shock. His
combination policy is depending on the optimal decision, which he proposed (p.204), from “the
policy that minimizes the expected loss from failure of the level of income to equal the desired
level.” He suggests that using a combination policy, so that the Fed respond to the information it
receives from the variation of interest rate in order to adjust money target. Let 𝑀 = 𝐵𝐵, where M
is money, i is interest rate, B is the coefficient and Bi is the response of M to the new information
about i, so that the Fed can use information from the variation of the interest rate. Find the value
of B (and call it optimal B) that minimizes the variance of output y around the desired level. The
optimal B:
2
𝑎1 𝜎𝑚
− 𝑏2 𝜎𝑦2
𝐵 =
.
𝑏1 𝜎𝑦2
∗

Note that there are two special cases of this optimal B which I left out in this chapter. When
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there is no IS shock (𝜎𝑦2 = 0): 𝐵 ∗ → ∞, this is the pure interest rate targeting. When there is no
𝑏

2
LM shock (𝜎𝑚
= 0): 𝐵 ∗ = − 𝑏2, this is an aggressive money supply targeting.
1

On the other hand, we can have the “inverted” Poole combination policy that the Fed
knows 32 the amount of money (e.g., nonborrowed reserves) it is letting in and out in order to
reach a particular interest rate objective. That is we let 𝑖 = 𝛩𝛩 where 𝛩 is the coefficient and

𝛩𝛩 is the response of i to the new information about M—so that the Fed adjusts interest rate

relative to its planned value when the Fed observes the money movement from its expected value.
In other words, the Fed uses its observation of how much it is unexpectedly changing the money
supply aggregate in order to reach the target. 33 Find the value of Θ (and call it optimal Θ) that
minimizes the variance of output y around the desired level. The optimal Θ:
𝛩=

𝑏1 𝜎𝑦2
.
2 − 𝑏 𝜎2
𝑎1 𝜎𝑚
2 𝑦

It is actually the reciprocal of the optimal B. Furthermore, the minimum variance of output y is
exactly the same as the original Poole combination policy. In other words, “Poole’s combination
policy can be turned on its head,”—i.e., an inverted version of original Poole’s (1970)
combination policy—, and get the same result.

In this chapter, I apply the inverted version of Poole’s (1970) combination policy analysis
from traditional IS-LM model to the new Keynesian Model. I formulate a combination Taylor
32

This is an abstract representation of the Fed’s observation of money surprise. The assumption of the Fed’s
operation on how they observe money surprise is simplified for making theoretical point, not for the purpose of
improving what the Fed is actually doing.
33

The value of money supply is determined by the condition that money demand equals money supply (i.e., an LM
curve). When money demand is changed from realized shocks so does the value of the money supply.
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rule where 𝐸𝑡−1 [𝑖𝑡 ] is the Taylor rule value of 𝑖𝑡 based on t-1 projection of inflation and output,
i.e., 𝐸𝑡−1 [𝑥𝑡 ] and 𝐸𝑡−1 [𝜋𝑡 ]. But there is an optimal adjustment based on the 𝑀𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 [𝑀𝑡 ]

which the Fed finds it has to use in order to keep the interest rate on the desire path. Since the
unobserved shocks are i.i.d, this combination Taylor rule component is orthogonal to t-1
information, so is just an “add on” to the Taylor rule with this new component.
Note that the model of 𝑀𝑡 derived in the section 3.4 is an abstract representation of the

Fed’s observation of money surprise, so the Fed can use signals about money to adjust their

interest rate. My model of the Fed’s operation on how it observes money surprise is a simplified
model for making theoretical point, not for the purpose of improving what the Fed is actually
doing.

In short, this paper is the analysis of signal problem when the Fed cannot adjust interest
rate according to a Taylor rule and only the signals from money are immediately available for the
Fed. In this paper solutions to the questions are determined within the context of the baseline
new Keynesian model. The questions arise as a result of the fact that the Fed operates through a
Taylor rule but only is able to observe the lag components of output gap and inflation. Since the
Fed is not able to respond to the missing components of output gap and inflation because those
components are not observed by the Fed, and as the result, the expected social welfare loss is
higher than its minimum value.

The analysis produces two major findings. First, it is possible to construct a combination
rule in which the constraint on the parameters of the two rule variables—output gap and
inflation—maintained in a certain relationship to each other and to show that the optimal
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combination rule is as good as or superior to the simple Taylor rule which has the signal problem.
Later I will show how much benefit we get from the combination rule. Second, signals coming
from unexpected quantity changes in money (i.e., the money signals) help to improve the simple
Taylor rule performance. CGG (1999)’s two arguments (a-b) cannot be the reasons for not using
the money signals. High variance of money demand and supply shocks will clearly reduce the
information value of money surprises, but the Fed can still improve the Taylor rule performance
from using money signals with high variance.

In Chapter 2, I have discussed the properties of full-information Taylor rules: a three-term
Taylor rule and a simple (“two-term”) Taylor rule. In Section 3.2, I continue the use of the
symbolic expression of Taylor rules from Chapter 2 for comparing the performance of three
Taylor rules which are two full-information Taylor rules and one limited-information Taylor rule.
The performance is measured by the social welfare losses of these three rules. 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the

social welfare loss with the (full-information) three-term Taylor rule built in, which I used in the
Chapter 2. 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the social welfare loss with the (full-information) two-term Taylor rule

built in, which is the simple Taylor rule in the Chapter 2. 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 is the social welfare loss with

the (limited-information) two-term Taylor rule built in, which is the simple Taylor rule in

Chapter 2 with expected values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 built in. See Table 3.1 for specifications of these

labels of social welfare loss. Since the three-term Taylor rule is impractical or “unrealistic” to
expect the Fed bases a rule on a shock term. 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is only a benchmark for comparison

purpose. The case for (limited-information) three-term Taylor rule is left in the Appendix 3.9.2
for interested readers. The focus in this chapter is the simple Taylor rule. Section 3.3 is the
section of the cause of the difference in loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏 . I then show how to
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derive the signals from money for constructing a combination rule in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5,
I show the construction of the combination rule and its performance as well as the impact of the
interest elasticity to the money signals. In Section 3.6, I will discuss the influence of the
variance of money demand to the money signals and to the performance of the combination rule.
Section 3.7 presents an example for measuring Taylor rule improvement from the money signals
with the parameters used in literature. Section 3.8 is the conclusion. Section 3.9 consists of the
appendixes.

Table 3.1. The Specifications of Three Social Welfare Losses
Social Welfare
Loss
𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑
𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢

Period Quadratic
Loss Function
1
𝐿 = (𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2 )
2
1
𝐿 = (𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2 )
2
1
𝐿 = (𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2 )
2
1

Taylor Rule
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡

𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝐸𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡

Note: 𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝑥𝑡+1 − 𝜎 (𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) + 𝑔𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡

3.2 The Performance of Three Taylor Rules in the Baseline NKM
I start from comparing the performance of three different Taylor rules in the context of the
baseline new Keynesian model for the analysis of monetary policy. This model contains two
equations. The first is the equation of output gap (i.e., the difference between current output 𝑦𝑡
𝑓

and the output in full-employment 𝑦𝑡 ) from the new Keynesian IS curve,
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝑥𝑡+1 −

1
(𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) + 𝑔𝑡 ,
𝜎 𝑡

where 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 is the first order autocorrelation process with the innovation

(1)
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𝜀𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀2 ). The second is the equation of inflation (i.e., the difference between price in
current period 𝑝𝑡 and price in previous period 𝑝𝑡−1) from the new Keynesian Phillips Curve,
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡 ,

where 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 is the first order autocorrelation process with the innovation

(2)

𝜂𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁�0, 𝜎𝜂2 �.

Then we substitute three different Taylor rules into (1) for 𝑖𝑡 based on the assumption of

commitment to the simple Taylor rule as we showed in Chapter 2. The first is the three-term

Taylor rule (𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ), in which Woodford (2001) argued that 𝜑𝑔 (= 𝜎) term should be added:
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 ,

(3)

𝚤̃𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 .

(4)

the second is the simple Taylor rule (𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ) from Chapter 2:

These two rules are full-information rules for which use actual values of output gap and inflation.
The third is an expected simple Taylor rule (𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 ):
𝚤̂𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝐸𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡 ,

(5)

(5) is the limited-information Taylor rule for which uses expected values of output gap and

inflation. In appendix 3.9.2, I discuss a case which involves a Taylor rule which is equation (5)
plus an additional term 𝜑𝑔 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 . After separately substituting (3), (4) and (5) into (1) for 𝑖𝑡 ,
we substitute the general solutions 34 of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 from solving (1) and (2) into the period
quadratic loss function

34

For the discussions of the general solutions, see Thurston (2010, 2012) and Huang (2017).
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𝐿=

1
𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2 ]
2

(6)

and we obtain three social welfare functions 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 in terms of (3), (4)

and (5). We can then obtain an unique constraint on the 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 ,
𝜑𝜋 = −

𝑘
𝑘𝑘(𝜌 − 1)
𝜑𝑥 +
+ 𝜌,
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)
𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)

(7)

for the minimum social welfare losses of 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 by using the first order
conditions from differentiating 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 with respect to 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 .

Next, we substitute (7) into 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 and we obtain three minimum

social welfare losses as shown
𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 =
𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚

and

1
𝛤
�
� 𝜎𝜂2 ,
2
2
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1) + 𝑘

1
𝛤
1 (𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2 2
2
= �
�𝜎 + �
� 𝜎𝜀 ,
𝐷2
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂 2

𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 =

1
𝛤
1 (𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 )𝜎 2
2
�
+
1�
𝜎
+
�
+ 𝑘 2 + 𝛤� 𝜎𝜀2 ,
𝜂
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2
2
𝐷2
𝑘

where 𝐷 = 𝑘 �− Γ(𝛽𝛽−1) 𝜑𝑥 +

𝑘𝑘(𝜌−1)

Γ(𝛽𝛽−1)

(8a)
(8b)

(8c)

+ 𝜌� + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜑𝑥 + (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝛽 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘𝑘. Figure

3.1 compares the differences of these three minimum social welfare losses as 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋

approach infinity. Note that I am not suggesting that the Fed can force 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 to approach
infinity. It is for the comparison purpose not for the practical reason by letting 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋
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approach infinity. I want to see whether any optimal 35 combination of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 , especially

when the values of such 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are very big, the performance of Taylor rules are improved or

not. If 𝜑𝑥 is approaching infinity then 𝐷2 term in the denominator of (8c) is approaching infinity,

and the second term in (8c) approaches zero, as the figure 3.1 shows the difference in loss

between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 can be completely eliminated by having 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋

approach infinity. 36 However, the figure 3.1 also shows that we cannot reduce the difference in
loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 by using the same trick.

That is the linear relationship between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 which guarantee optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 , as well as
minimum social welfare loss.
35

36

For the discussion of the relationship between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 see Huang (2017).
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Figure 3.1. Three Minimized Social Welfare Losses

3.3 What Makes the Difference between 𝑳𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔,𝒎𝒎𝒎 and 𝑳𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖,𝒎𝒎𝒎
The comparison of 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 using two full-information Taylor rules,

𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , were studied in the previous chapter. Here the focus is on the loss

difference between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 . Let 𝑥�𝑡 and 𝜋�𝑡 are the output gap and inflation

when the Fed does not adjust its interest rate to 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . The following two equations must be

true since none of the t-1 variables changes, and because 𝜀 and 𝜂 are orthogonal to everything,

and because the shocks to output gap and inflation will be 𝜀 and 𝑘𝑘 + 𝜂 when 𝜀 and 𝜂 are

unobserved:

𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 ,

(9a)
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and
𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋�𝑡 = 𝑘𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 ,

(9b)

where 𝑥�t is the expected value of current period’s output gap and 𝜋�𝑡 is the expected value of

current period’s inflation. We then name 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷 and 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋�𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷 and substitute DX

and DP into (6) for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 to obtain the loss difference (DL) between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 as:
𝐷𝐷 =
=
=

1
𝐸[(𝐷𝐷)2 + 𝛤(𝐷𝐷)2 ]
2

1
𝐸[(𝑘𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 )2 + 𝛤(𝜀𝑡 )2 ]
2

1 2
1
(𝑘 + 𝛤)𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 .
2
2

(10)

This loss difference, as we show in Figure 3.1, is the result when the Fed sets the interest rate
before observing current variables of output gap and inflation which contains information of

shocks 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . In other words, the Fed commits to 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 . In this situation the Fed cannot

adjust its interest rate for those shocks according to 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 . On the other hand, the information
of money is immediately available to the Fed, so the Fed can use the signals coming from

unexpected quantity changes in money, which we can simply call it the money signal, to adjust
their interest rate. In the next section, we will show how to derive the money signal and use it to
develop a combination policy rule for reducing DL.

3.4 Derivation of the Money Signal
As Figure 3.1 shows, the difference in loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 cannot be

reduced by using different set of optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 , or even when these values are
forced to approach infinity. Thus using the money signals are the simple and direct way to
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reduce the difference in loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 when new information about 𝜀𝑡
and 𝜂𝑡 are unobserved. Here we show that the money signals are actually a linear function of 𝜀𝑡
and 𝜂𝑡 . First we recall the output gap is defined as the difference between current output (𝑦𝑡 )
𝑓

𝑓

and the output in full-employment (𝑦𝑡 ), i.e., 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 , and inflation is defined as the

difference between price in current period (𝑝𝑡 ) and in previous period (𝑝𝑡−1), i.e., 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1.
Second, we apply the log-linearized Euler condition of money and consumption:
𝑚𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 =

𝜎
1
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺𝑡 ,
𝑏
𝑏

(11)

where 1/𝑏 is the semi interest elasticity37 of money demand and 𝛺 is the money demand shock

2 ).
which is also the first order autocorrelation process with the innovation 𝜔~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜛
𝑓

Substituting 𝑝𝑡 in (11) by 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑡 in (11) by 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 from our definition of output gap
and inflation, and then substituting 𝑥𝑡 by 𝑥�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 and 𝜋𝑡 by 𝜋�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 from the discussion in

section 3.3, we then obtain the money equation as
𝑚𝑡 = 𝜋�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑝𝑡−1 +

𝜎
1
𝑓
�𝑥�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑦𝑡 � − 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 .
𝑏
𝑏

(12)

Finally, we obtain the money signals by subtracting the expected value of (12) from (12) as
𝑚𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑚𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷 +

𝜎
(𝐷𝐷) + 𝜔𝑡
𝑏

𝜎
= 𝑘𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡
𝑏

𝜎
= �𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 ,
𝑏
37

(13)
1

Empirically, we use semielasticity of money demand with respect to nominal interest rate: �

1

𝑏 1+𝑖𝑡

�. Walsh (2003,

p.57): “Empirical work often estimates money-demand equations in which the log of real money balances is a
function of log income and the level of nominal interest rate. The coefficient on the nominal interest is then equal to
the semielasticity of money demand with respect to nominal interest rate.”
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where all the shock terms 𝜀𝑡 , 𝜂𝑡 and 𝜔𝑡 are independent. (13) is the difference in value between
actual money demand and the expectation of money demand, and it will be used to improve

𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 ’s performance because the money signals are constituted by the shocks which are not

included in 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 .

We are now ready to turn to the next section for the combination policy rule using the
money signals—i.e., I add the money signals and its coefficient 𝜑𝑚 in the simple Taylor rule.

The discussion in the next section is a way of explaining how the money signals permits the Fed
to improve their perception of the actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . In the next section I am finding the optimal

value of 𝜑𝑚 at its optimal setting. This is telling us the optimal response to the interest rate from

new information that comes from the money surprise. We could less elegantly do it in two steps:
find the “best” revision of 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 , then insert them into the 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 solutions to find the

optimal interest rate adjustment. By deriving the optimal 𝜑𝑚 I am doing all this in one step.

3.5 The Combination Policy Rule and its Performance
Before I get into details, one thing needs to be clarified. The focus is on the simple Taylor rule
for this chapter, and the reason is that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to expect the Fed bases a
rule on a shock term. It is the same reason for discussing the properties of the simple Taylor rule
in Chapter 2. The three-term Taylor rule is only a benchmark for comparison purpose. For
interested readers, Appendix 3.9.2 provides the discussion of a combination policy with the
three-term Taylor rule built in.
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Let 𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 express a combination policy rule from combining (5) and (13) which its

equation is shown as

𝜎
𝚤̃𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝐸𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑚 ��𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 �.
𝑏

When we substitute (14) into (1) for 𝑖𝑡 , we can observe that the previous (9a) becomes
1

(14)

𝜎

− 𝜎 𝜑𝑚 ��𝑘 + 𝑏 � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 � + 𝜀𝑡 , and the previous (10) becomes

2
(𝜑 (𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) − 𝜎𝜎)2 2 𝜑𝑚
𝜑2
1
1
2
� = (𝑘 2 + 𝛤) � 𝑚 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝑚
𝜎
+
𝜎𝜛
� + 𝜎𝜂2 .
𝐷𝐷
𝜀
2
2
2
2
2
2
𝜎
𝜎 𝑏
𝜎

(15)

The symbol ^ on DL is for distinguishing (15) from (10). Since the constraint on 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 is
� for DL into 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 , and then we
unique, we can simply substitute this difference in loss 𝐷𝐷

obtain the social welfare loss 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 as

(𝑘 2 + 𝛤) 2
1
1 (𝑘 2 + 𝛤)(𝜑𝑚 (𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) − 𝜎𝜎)2 2
2
𝜑
�
𝜎
+
�
� 𝜎𝜀
𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 + �1 +
𝑚
𝜂
2
𝜎2
2
𝜎 2 𝑏2
1 (𝑘 2 + 𝛤) 2
2
+ �
𝜑𝑚 � 𝜎𝜛
.
𝜎2
2

If the value of 𝜑𝑚 is zero in (16), 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 becomes 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 (i.e., equation (8c)). The

(16)

minimum value of (16), i.e., 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑚 will be obtained when
𝜎𝜎(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)𝜎𝜀2
𝜑𝑚 =
2
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝑏 2 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝑏 2 𝜎𝜛
=

𝜎𝜎

2
𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
𝑏2
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) �1 +
∗
�
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2
𝜎𝜀2

,

(17)
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and this analytical value of 𝜑𝑚 38, as expected from the demonstration of the “inverted” Poole
combination policy in section 3.1, has 𝜑𝑚 to vary inversely with the variance of 𝜔, 𝜂 and 𝜀.

2
is very large so the value of 𝜑𝑚 is very close to zero, in this situation,
When the value of 𝜎𝜛

there are not much of money signals for the improvement of the Fed’s perception of the actual 𝜀𝑡
and 𝜂𝑡 . The validity of equation (17) can be examined by assuming there is only 𝑔𝑡 shock (this

2
= 0) and then the loss is eliminated when I substitute the equation
implied that 𝜎𝜂2 = 0 and 𝜎𝜛

(17) in the equation (14) for 𝜑𝑚 . This implies that the money signals are able to eliminate the
difference in the social welfare losses which caused by unobserved 𝜀𝑡 . In other words, when

money signals of 𝜀𝑡 is used with the optimal 𝜑𝑚 (17), the value of equation (10) is equal to zero
for only having one shock 𝜀𝑡 . A similar result also applies to the case when only unobserved 𝜂𝑡
happens in the model economy.

Figure 3.2 shows the improvement of social welfare loss from the money signals.
𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum social welfare loss with the money signals when the unit shock 39 of

money demand exists. 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑚 is smaller than 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 which is the social welfare loss

with the expected simple Taylor rule described in the section 3.2.

38

39

Solving

𝜕𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜑𝑚

= 0 for 𝜑𝑚 , we obtain (17). Since all variables have optimal settings, (17) is optimal.

The variance of money demand 𝜎𝜛2 equals to one.
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Figure 3.2. The Improvement of Social Welfare Loss

Note: b is assumed with value equal to 0.5. All parameter values are the same as used in the section 2.

It is clear from Figure 3.2 that we cannot bring down 𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚 to 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚𝑚 by using

different sets of optimal 𝜑′𝑠 or forcing the optimal 𝜑′𝑠 higher. The only way to improve the

social welfare loss when using the expected simple Taylor rule is by applying the money signals
for improving the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . In appendix 3.9.2, I compare and discuss
the improvement of social welfare losses for a case in which the Taylor rule contains the 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡

term.

For simplicity, the special case for the 𝜑𝑚 can be also shown as

𝜑𝑚 =

𝜎𝜎(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2 + 𝑏 2

(18)
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2 ⁄ 2
when we arbitrarily let �𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
� 𝜎𝜀 = 1 in (17). 40 This special case can be used for

understanding the relationship among minimized social welfare losses, 𝜑𝑚 and 𝑏. The special
case is only for comparison purpose. In reality the value of 𝜑𝑚 is affected by the variance of

shocks. Figure 3.9.1 in the Appendix 3.9 shows that 𝜑𝑚 is always greater than zero and its value

has a limit when 𝑏 approaches infinity by using equation (18). 41 Since 𝑏 is the inverse of

interest semi-elasticity of money demand, the bigger the value of 𝑏 the smaller the interest semi-

elasticity will be. The long time debate on the stability of money demand 42 through the different
estimated values of interest elasticity of money demand should not affect the improvement of the
Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 by using money signals when the coefficient of money
40

𝜑𝑚 =
=

𝜎𝜎

(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) �1 +
𝜎𝜎

(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) +

𝑏2
�
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2

𝑏2
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)

𝜎𝜎
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2 + 𝑏 2
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)
𝜎𝜎(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)
=
.
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2 + 𝑏 2
=

41

The value of 𝜑𝑚 is determined by the inverse of the interest rate semi-elasticity 𝑏, which is the factor for the
𝜎
stability of money demand. 𝜑𝑚 will equal to zero only when 𝑏 = 0 or − . Since 𝑏 > 0 from our derivation of
𝑘
money demand in section 3.4, 𝜑𝑚 > 0. The unstable money demand is associated with high interest elasticity
according to Teles and Zhou (2005, p.52)’s observation of Ball (2001): “Ball (2001) argues that the data after 1987
represent evidence against a stable money demand. He estimates a linear relationship between logarithm of real
money, the logarithm of output, and a nominal interest rate for subperiods of 1903-94. For the period 1903-87 the
evidence is consistent with a stable relationship with a unitary income elasticity and a relatively high interest
elasticity, as shown by Lucas (1988) and Stock and Watson (1993). However, the need to account for the low
reaction of M1 to lower interest rates and higher output after 1980 lowers both the estimated interest elasticity and
income elasticity. The relatively low income and interest elasticity in the postwar period (1974-94) are significantly
different from the unitary income elasticity and relatively high interest elasticity in the prewar period (1903-45),
leading Ball to argue against a stable long run money demand.”
42

Walsh (2010, pp. 48-52)
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signal 𝜑𝑚 has different values of 𝑏 built in. The relatively interest inelastic money demand 43

implied by 𝑏 approaching infinity does not play an important role for stopping using the money
signals.

3.6 The Effectiveness of Money Signals
Whether the Fed can respond to unobservable shocks through the money signals is important for
the performance of its monetary policy rule. The effectiveness of the money signals is therefore
the key to the combination policy performance. At the end of Section 3.5, I discussed the value
2
of 𝑏 only have limited impact to the money signals. In this section, I study the impact of 𝜎𝜛
to

the money signals and to the performance of the combination policy rule.

3.6.1 How is 𝝋𝒎 Working in the Combination Policy?

The 𝜑𝑚 is the optimal response coefficient of the interest rate to the money surprise. How does

the Fed infer unobserved 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 from the money signals? The Fed controls the money supply
𝜎

so it is capable of calculating the money signals. Recalled that 𝑚𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 [𝑚𝑡 ] = �𝑘 + 𝑏 � 𝜀𝑡 +
𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 . The information content of the money signals are then used to indicate 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 as
𝜎

follows. The estimated coefficient of 𝜎𝜀2 conditional on �𝑘 + 𝑏 � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 is

𝜎
𝜎
𝑎�1 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶 �𝜀𝑡 , �𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 ��𝑉𝑉𝑉 ��𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 � ,
𝑏
𝑏

43

𝜎
𝜎 2
2
= �𝑘 + � 𝜎𝜀2 / ��𝑘 + � 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
�,
𝑏
𝑏

“The key point is that money demand shocks can induce volatile behavior of interest rates. This is particularly
true if money demand is relatively interest inelastic in the short run, as is the case for bank reserves….It is for this
reason that in practice central banks use interbank lending rates as the policy instrument,…” CGG (1999, p.1686)
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and
𝜎�𝜀2

2

𝜎
= 𝐸 ��1 − 𝑎�1 ��𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 �� � ,
𝑏
𝜎

and the estimated coefficient of 𝜎�𝜂2 conditional on �𝑘 + 𝑏 � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 is that

𝜎
𝜎
𝑎�2 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶 �𝜂𝑡 , �𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 ��𝑉𝑉𝑉 ��𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 � ,
𝑏
𝑏

and

𝜎 2
2
= 𝜎𝜂2 / ��𝑘 + � 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
�,
𝑏

2

𝜎 2
2
𝜎�𝜂2 = 𝐸 ��1 − 𝑎�2 ��𝑘 + � 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
�� � ,
𝑏

2
are the variances of output gap, inflation and money demand, which are
where 𝜎𝜀2 , 𝜎𝜂2 and 𝜎𝜛

described in the equation (17). 𝑎�1 and 𝑎�2 are the parameter values which can be estimated by the
central bank. When the money signals are changed by the proportional to
𝜎 2

𝑎�1

𝜎
𝑏

�𝑘+ �

, this indicates

2
that there is changes in 𝜀𝑡 through changes in ��𝑘 + 𝑏 � 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
�. Then the Fed can

adjust its interest rates in response to 𝜀𝑡 by the amount which is determined by 𝜑𝑚 from the

section 3.4. The Fed can also adjust its interest rates in response to 𝜂𝑡 through 𝑎�2 as well. As

long as the variance of money demand is small, the money signals are a good tool for the Fed to
adjust interest rates in response to the unobserved 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 . The bigger the variance of money
demand, the less effective the money signals will be. When the variance of money demand

approaches to infinity, the numerical value of the money signals are zero. This implies that the
money signals may not be used as signal for unobserved 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 when the variance of money
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2
demand is big. Figure 3.3 shows this negative relation among 𝜎𝜛
, 𝑎�1 and 𝑎�2 . From the two

expressions of information content for 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 , I can find the values changes in 𝑎�1 and 𝑎�2 when
2
2
𝜎𝜛
changes by taking the first partial derivatives of 𝑎�1 and 𝑎�2 with respect to 𝜎𝜛
:

and

∂𝑎�1
<0
2
𝜕𝜎𝜛

∂𝑎�2
< 0,
2
𝜕𝜎𝜛

2
2
so the bigger the 𝜎𝜛
, the smaller the values of 𝑎�1 and 𝑎�2 will be. Thus, when 𝜎𝜛
is high, the

improvement of the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 through money signals is low. Figure

2
3.3 shows that the values of 𝑎�1 and 𝑎�2 decrease when the value of 𝜎𝜛
increases.

Figure 3.3. The Money Signals and The Noise in Money Demand
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3.6.2 The Social Welfare Loss and the “Noise” in Money Demand
The money demand shocks affects the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 and this is reflected
on the minimized social welfare loss 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑚 as well. When there are no money demand
2
shocks, the value of 𝜎𝜛
equals zero. Then the Fed’s will have the best perception of actual 𝜀𝑡

and 𝜂𝑡 by using the money signals, and 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑚 will be smaller. Figure 3.4 below shows

2
that when 𝜎𝜛
= 0, the minimized social welfare loss is below the minimized social welfare loss

2
≠ 0.
when 𝜎𝜛

Figure 3.4. The Impact of 𝝈𝟐𝝕 on the Improvement of Social Welfare Losses
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3.7 A Numerical Example: Measuring Improvement from the Money Signal
The effectiveness of the money signals is determined by optimized 𝜑𝑚 , which is determined by
2
parameters and 𝜎𝜀2 , 𝜎𝜂2 and 𝜎𝜛
. And the value of 𝜑𝑚 is in part determined by the inverse of the

2
interest rate elasticity 𝑏. I examine the values of 𝑏 and 𝜎𝜛
to L using Walsh (2010)’s parameters
2
, I use Cooley
which 𝑘 = 0.05, 𝛽 = 0.99, 𝜎 = 1, 𝜌 = 0.5 and 𝛤 = 0.25. 44 For the value of 𝜎𝜛

and Leroy (1981)’s standard error of M1 demand 𝜎𝜛 = 0.028 which is the largest one according
to Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992)’s survey paper. 45 The values of 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝜂2 are from Ireland

(2011)’s table 1 where he reports 𝜎𝜀 = 0.0868 and 𝜎𝜂 = 0.0017. The value of 𝑏 is set to be 2

based on Lucas (2000)’s estimation of 0.5 for the interest rate elasticity of money demand (M1).
First, Figure 3.5 shows that 𝜑𝑚 is nonzero positive value at 𝑏 = 2. This figure also implies

that the interest rate elasticity of money demand (M1) may play less important role in monetary

policy then conventional beliefs. Whether the money signals are measured with a stable money
demand to interest rates or not, the social welfare loss should be still improved by the money
signals.

44

Marest and Thurston (2017) reported the parameter estimations in the literature of NKM. Their report also
includes Walsh (2010)’s parameters. See Table 1 in the Appendix 3.9.3 for details.
45

See Table 2 in the Appendix 3.9.3 for details.
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Figure 3.5. The Relationship between 𝝋𝒎 and b

Note: The values of 𝝈𝟐𝜺 and 𝝈𝟐𝜼 are from Peter Ireland (2011)’s table 1, p.42. The value of 𝝈𝟐𝝕 is from Baba, Hendry and Starr
(1992) table 2, p.44.

Figure 3.6 shows the improvement of minimized social welfare loss from the money
signals. All the social welfare losses L0, L1, L2, and L3 are from the definition in previous
sections. L0 curve is the optimal social welfare loss defined in section 3.2. L1 curve shows the
outcome of social welfare loss when 𝜑𝑔 = 0 and the existence of g-shocks defined in section 3.2.
L2 is the loss when the Fed’s Taylor rule uses only expected values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 defined in

section 3.2. L3 is the loss when the Fed uses the combination policy rule (with the money
signals) defined in section 3.5. L3 is below L2 which indicates the improvement of social

welfare loss from the money signals. Table 3 in the appendix 3.9.3 provides the definitions of L0,
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L1, L2 and L3. Table 4 in the appendix 3.9.3 compares the improvement of the minimized social
welfare loss to different values of 𝑏 and Γ from empirical studies. Note that 𝑏 and 𝛤 are
parameter values that cannot be used as instrument.

Figure 3.6. The Improvements of L from the Money Signals

The money demand shocks affects the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 and this is

reflected on the minimized social welfare loss 𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑚 as well. When demand shocks are

big, the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 is worse. Figure 3.7 shows the perception of actual

𝜀𝑡 represented by 𝑎�1 and the perception of actual 𝜂𝑡 represented by 𝑎�2 has small values when the
2
value of 𝜎𝜛
is big. Also Figure 3.7 implies that the Fed can use money signals to improve their

perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 because the biggest value of the 𝜎𝜛 is 0.028. Note that the 𝑎�1
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curve is lower than 𝑎�2 curve in the Figure 3.7 but the 𝑎�1 curve is higher than 𝑎�2 curve in the
Figure 3.3. This is because 𝑏 = 2 in the Figure 3.7 and 𝑏 = 0.5 in the Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.7. The Social Welfare Loss and the Money Signals

3.8 Conclusion
The combination policy can improve the social welfare loss when the Fed sets its monetary
policy with unobservable shocks. This paper uses an inverted version of Poole’s (1970)
combination policy analysis and shows that the social welfare loss is improved from the money
signals. 𝑏 affects the effectiveness of the money signals, but the money signals always have non2
zero values even when b has very big values. 𝜎𝜛
affects the money signals and the social

2
welfare loss. 𝜎𝜛
will decrease 𝜑𝑚 and raise loss to some limit. We should use combination

100

policy as long as there is any perceptible gain, 𝜑𝑚 > 0, and the social welfare loss will be
reduced by at least a little.

3.9 Appendixes
3.9.1 The Figure for the value of 𝝋𝒎

Figure 3.8.1. shows the value of 𝜑𝑚 when 𝑏 is approaching positive (negative) infinity with

𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99 and 𝜎 = 1.

Figure 3.8.1. The Values of 𝝋𝒎
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3.9.2 The Example of Using the Money Signals to Improve L when the
Quantity of 𝝋𝒈 in Taylor Rules are not Zero

In this example I apply the steps from section 3.2 to section 3.5 for Taylor rules whose have the
quantity of 𝜑𝑔 not equal to zero. These Taylor rules are TR0:
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 ,

a limited-information Taylor rule TR0’:

(A1)

𝑖𝑡′ = 𝜑𝑥 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝐸𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 ,

(A2)

𝜎
𝑖𝑡′′ = 𝜑𝑥 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝐸𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜑𝑚 ��𝑘 + � 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 �.
𝑏

(A3)

and a combination policy rule using the money signals TR0’’:

Substituting these three rules (A1), (A2) and (A3) separately into (1) for 𝑖𝑡 and then solving (1)

and (2) for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 accordingly. Next I substitute each set of general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡
1

associated with (A1), (A2) and (A3) into the period quadratic loss function: 𝐿 = 2 𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2 ]

and we obtain three social welfare loss functions L0, L0’ and L0’’ associated with (A1), (A2) and

(A3). Separately minimizing these three social welfare loss function and solving the first-order
conditions for 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 , I obtain the same unique constraint (7) of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 :
𝑘

𝜑𝜋 = − 𝛤(𝛽𝛽−1) 𝜑𝑥 +

𝑘𝑘(𝜌−1)

𝛤(𝛽𝛽−1)

+ 𝜌, and furthermore solving the first order condition for 𝜑𝑚 , I

obtain the same optimal value (17) of 𝜑𝑚 :
𝜑𝑚 =

𝜎𝜎

.
2
𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛
𝑏2
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) �1 +
∗
�
(𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎)2
𝜎𝜀2

Next, substituting (7) into L0, L0’ and L0’’ and substituting (17) into L0’’, I obtain three
minimum social welfare losses:
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𝐿0 =

1
𝛤
�
� 𝜎2,
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1)2 + 𝑘 2 𝜂

1
𝛤
1
+ 1� 𝜎𝜂2 + (𝑘 2 + 𝛤)𝜎𝜀2 ,
𝐿0′ = �
2
2
2
2 𝛤(𝛽𝛽 − 1) + 𝑘

and

(𝑘 2 + 𝛤) 2
1
1 (𝑘 2 + 𝛤)(𝜑𝑚 (𝑏𝑏 + 𝜎) − 𝜎𝜎)2 2
2
𝐿0′′ = 𝐿0′ + �1 +
𝜑
�
𝜎
+
�
� 𝜎𝜀
𝑚
𝜂
2
𝜎2
2
𝜎 2 𝑏2

where 𝜑𝑚 =

1 (𝑘 2 + 𝛤) 2
2
+ �
𝜑𝑚 � 𝜎𝜛
,
2
𝜎2

(𝑏𝑏+𝜎)�1+

𝜎𝜎

2
𝜎2
𝑏2
𝜂+𝜎𝜛
∗
�
(𝑏𝑏+𝜎)2
𝜎2
𝜀

.

(A4)
(𝐴5)

(A6)

Table 3.8.2 shows the comparison of L0, L0’ and L0’’ under the special cases. The first
column of Table 3.8.2 shows the performance of the combination policy rule is as good as the
full-information Taylor rule when there are only g-shocks, so we should use the combination
policy rule when there are only unobservable g-shocks. The second column of Table 3.8.2
shows that the performance of the combination policy is the same as the limited-information
Taylor rule when there are only unobservable u-shocks. The third column of Table 3.8.2 shows
that the performance of combination policy rule are the same as the full-information Taylor rule
and the limited-information Taylor rule when there are only ω-shocks. The fourth column of
Table 3.8.2 shows that the performance of combination policy rule is better than the limitedinformation Taylor rule, so we should use combination policy rule when current shocks are
unobservable.
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Table 3.8.2. Comparison of L0, L0’ and L0’’

𝜑𝑚
L0
L0’
L0’’

𝜎𝜀2 = 1, 𝜎𝜂2 = 0, 𝜎𝜛2 = 0
0.435

0
1.045
0

𝜎𝜀2 = 0, 𝜎𝜂2 = 1, 𝜎𝜛2 = 0
0

1.667
2.167
2.167

𝜎𝜀2 = 0, 𝜎𝜂2 = 0, 𝜎𝜛2 = 1
0

0
0
0

𝜎𝜀2 = 1, 𝜎𝜂2 = 1, 𝜎𝜛2 = 1
0.316

1.667
3.211
2.453

Note: Assumed parameters are 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99, 𝛤 = 2, 𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝜌 = 0.5, 𝜑𝜋 = 1.5 and 𝜑𝑥 = −2.18 +
3.367𝜑𝜋

3.9.3 Tables of Empirical Resources
I reproduce Marest and Thurston (2017)’s table 3 here and I give a comment on the use of 𝛤 in
the Note.

Table 1
Parameters Used in Literature
Author
Year
Parameters
𝑘
𝛽
Woodford 2003
0.024
0.99
Billi
2008
0.024
0.9926
Walsh
2010
0.05
0.99

0.16
0.16
1

𝜎

Γ
0.003
0.003
0.25

0.4
0.1
0.5

𝜌

Note: We should ignore the small values of Γ when we compare the improvement of L. The smaller
the Γ, the smaller the L will be. Small Γ implies that the weight on output gap is small and L is less
affected by the changes in output gap from 𝑔𝑡 . Since the money signals improved L mainly by
improving output gap, an almost zero weight on x sends a wrong message that the money signals
were ineffective.

I reproduce Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992) table 2 here.
Table 2
2
𝜎𝜛
used in Literature
Author
Goldfeld
Garcia and Pak
Rose
Gordon
McAleer, Pagan and Volker
Simpson and Porter
Cooley and Leroy
Baba, Hendry and Starr

Year
1973
1979
1985
1984
1985
1980
1981
1992

Standard Error of M1
0.43%
0.63%
0.48%
0.43%
0.31%
0.52%-0.59%
2.80%
0.38%
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Table 3 shows the definitions of L0, L1, L2 and L3.
Table 3
Definitions of Social Welfare Loss L
The social welfare loss with Woodford’s Taylor rule
L0
(𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔 𝑔𝑡 ) built in.
The social welfare loss with the simple Taylor rule
L1
(𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝜋𝑡 ) built in.
The social welfare loss with the simple (unobservable
L2
shocks) Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥 𝐸𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋 𝐸𝑡−1 𝜋𝑡 ) built in.
The social welfare loss with the combination policy rule
L3
built in.
Here I show the relationship between 𝑏, 𝛤 and The Improvement of L.
Table 4
The Relationship between 𝑏, Γ and L.
b
The Improvement of L
Γ
small
big
big
big
small
big ( Γ > b)
small
small
almost no improvement
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